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EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED:
A CORPUS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF EXECUTIVE
POWER☨
Eleanor Miller & Heather Obelgoner*
“Nothing Since my return to America, has alarmed me so much, as
those habits of Fraud, in the use of Language which appear in
conversation and in public writings. Words are employed like paper
money, to cheat the widow and the fatherless and every honest
Man.”—John Adams1

☨

Where we quote directly from Founding Era documents, the spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and
typeface (where practicable) have been maintained from the original. It should be noted that
eighteenth-century writers and publishers generally did not abide by any universal standards in spelling,
punctuation, capitalization, and typeface. In the preface to his dictionary, Samuel Johnson lamented that,
when he set about the task of compiling entries for his dictionary, he found contemporary speech to be
“copious without order, and energetick without rules . . . there was perplexity to be disentangled, and
confusion to be regulated; choice was to be made out of boundless variety, without any established
principle of selection.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 7 (London 1785).
A guide to English grammar published at the end of the eighteenth century explained that
Punctuation is the art of marking in writing the several pauses, or rests, between
sentences, and the parts of sentences. . . . So the doctrine of punctuation must needs be
very imperfect: few precise rules can be given which will hold without exception in all
cases; but much must be left to the judgment and taste of the writer.
ROBERT LOWTH, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH GRAMMAR 114–15 (Philadelphia, R. Aitken
1799). For a significantly more comprehensive elucidation on Founding Era punctuation conventions, see
Michael Nardella, Knowing When to Stop: Is the Punctuation of the Constitution Based on Sound or
Sense?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 667 (2007).
*
Eleanor Miller, J.D. 2018, and Heather Obelgoner, J.D. 2018, are graduates of Georgia State University
College of Law. Eleanor is an attorney at the Department of Treasury in Washington, D.C., and Heather
is a law clerk to the Honorable Robert Benham of the Supreme Court of Georgia. The opinions (and any
mistakes) in this Article are solely ours; they are not reflective of, nor should they be ascribed to, our
employers. Finally, we extend our sincere gratitude to Clark Cunningham for his instrumental guidance
and support during the research and authoring of this paper. We also thank Edward Finegan and Julian
Mortenson, who kindly contributed their valuable time and invaluable expertise during the drafting of this
paper. The research reported in this article was presented at a Workshop on Law & Linguistics, hosted by
Georgia State University, Friday, October 18, 2019. PowerPoints and video from the Georgia State
presentation, including comments by Julian Mortenson and Edward Finegan, are available
at: http://www.clarkcunningham.org/Workshop-Law-Linguistics.html.
1. Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Lincoln (June 19, 1789), in The Adams Papers, FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-0629
[https://perma.cc/B63UVLQ6].
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INTRODUCTION
“Article II allows me to do whatever I want,” President Donald
Trump claimed, without even a whiff of irony.2 And though even the
most fledgling of armchair constitutional scholars will recognize that
this statement does not comport with the reality of our Constitution or
system of governance, exactly what is meant by Article II’s vestment
of the “executive power” in the President is a different matter. Though
this question may have received more attention as of late, it certainly
is not novel. Within a year of the Constitution’s ratification, John
Adams opined that “Executive Power is uncertain.”3 And indeed, of
the three branches of the American government, the limits and scope
of the executive branch have proven to be the most elusive to scholars
and jurists alike. President Barack Obama’s enlistment of the
executive order to implement policies that Congress declined to pass
led Congressional Republicans to label him “a dictator who abused his
power and disregarded the Constitution.”4 More recently, President
Trump has claimed that he, as President, has a “complete power to
pardon,” setting off yet another firestorm of questions surrounding the
extent of executive power.5
And the question remains: what really is executive power? One
answer lies in the original meaning of the phrase itself. Importantly,
original meaning is not the same as original intent. Put more eloquently

2. Jason Lemon, Trump Insists the Constitution’s Article II ‘Allows Me to Do Whatever I Want,’
NEWSWEEK (June 16, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-insists-constitution-allows-dowhatever-want-1444235 [https://perma.cc/6N5F-FZTR].
3. John Adams, Notes of Debates in the United States Senate (July 15, 1789), in 3 THE ADAMS
PAPERS: DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 217, 220 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-03-02-0008-0001 [https://perma.cc/C6KQ-HNVN].
4. Carl Hulse, Trump Follows Obama’s Lead in Flexing Executive Muscle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/us/politics/donald-trump-barack-obama-executiveorders.html [https://perma.cc/C5YT-TH6U]. During the Obama presidency, House Speaker Paul Ryan
remarked, “We have an increasingly lawless presidency where [Obama] is actually doing the job of
Congress, writing new policies and laws without going through Congress.” Id.
5. Doug Stanglin, In 2-hour Tweetstorm, Trump Claims a President’s ‘Complete Power to Pardon,’
USA TODAY (July 22, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/07/22/2hour-tweetstorm-trump-claims-presidents-complete-power-pardon/501887001/ [https://perma.cc/KE4D3D6H].
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by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, “[i]t is the law that governs, not the
intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only
the laws that they enact which bind us.”6 Whereas the original intent
inquiry focuses on the Framers’ expectations and desires, original
meaning concerns itself with the “common meaning of the enacted
text.”7 This relatively new form of originalist thinking, dubbed “public
meaning originalism,” acknowledges the inherent difficulty (and
arguable futility) in attempting to ascertain the Framers’ intentions and
instead focuses on analyzing the “communicative content” or
linguistic meaning of constitutional text.8 In the past, scholars have
been forced to rely heavily on Founding Era dictionaries and legal texts
when analyzing the public meaning of a constitutional phrase.9 Despite
its appeal, this method has been the subject of significant criticism
because neither dictionaries nor legal texts accurately reflect
generalized public meaning.10 However, modern linguistic tools, such
as large-scale electronic databases comprised of searchable texts
known as corpora, provide a unique opportunity for updated originalist
interpretations.11
This paper will engage linguistic and historical analysis in an effort
to discern the original public meaning of the phrase executive power
as used in Article II of the United States Constitution. In light of
6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997).
7. Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (2007).
8. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 268
(2019); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 275 (2017) (“The key idea
is that the participants in the complex process of [constitutional] authorship intended to make the
communicative content of the constitutional text accessible to the public at the time the text went through
the ratification process.”).
9. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 284.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 291; see also CORPUS LINGUISTICS: READINGS IN A WIDENING DISCIPLINE 1 (Geoffrey
Sampson & Diana McCarthy eds., 2005) (defining “corpus” as “a collection of specimens of a language
as used in real life, in speech or writing, selected as a sizeable ‘fair sample’ of the language as a whole or
of some linguistic genre, and hence as a useful source of evidence for research on the language”). This
paper primarily relies on the beta version of Brigham Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era
American English (COFEA). The first of its kind, the COFEA combines a wide variety of Founding Era
texts of all genres and contains approximately 150 million searchable words from over 118 thousand texts
dating from 1750 to 1800. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 294; Corpus of Founding Era American English
(COFEA), BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lcl.byu.edu/projects/cofea/
[https://perma.cc/WB8L-TZNJ] (last visited Nov. 23, 2019) [hereinafter COFEA].
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significant modern controversy surrounding the proper limits of
executive authority, an original meaning interpretation of this critical
phrase will illuminate the executive’s function as it was commonly
understood at the time of constitutional ratification. Part I will engage
in a linguistic analysis of the phrase executive power, drawing
primarily on corpus linguistic methodology surrounding the phrase’s
Founding Era usage. Part II will analyze the history of Article II, with
particular attention to the public discourse concerning the scope and
reach of the British king’s powers. Part III will fuse these areas of
analysis and propose a synthesized original meaning of the phrase
executive power. And, finally, Part IV will consider the Supreme Court
cases of Myers v. United States and Steel Seizure,12 seminal cases of
executive power jurisprudence, as well as the public discourse
surrounding those cases at the time of their being decided.
I. Linguistic Analysis
Corpus linguistics provides an empirical framework for original
meaning analysis. Namely, the extensive word-based data collections
allow researchers to track trends in word usage during the Founding
Era and beyond. By reviewing lines of text from both sophisticated
legal documents and more general writings from the era, researchers
can potentially gain insight into the original meaning of a word by
tracking the frequency and contextual usages most commonly
associated with historical words and phrases across all genres of text.
This feature is particularly important in light of “linguistic drift,” the
idea that the meaning of a word shifts subtly over time, fundamentally
altering the way that the word or phrase is perceived by one generation
as compared to another.13 Importantly, linguistic drift may be
responsible for disparities between the original meaning of a
constitutional phrase and the way that the phrase has been interpreted
by courts and scholars in modern times.
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
13. Solum, supra note 8, at 279 (“When a word or phrase is used in its conventional sense, the relevant
patterns of usage are those of the linguistic community to which the author belongs at the time the text is
written.”).
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The following corpus linguistic research is premised on the
hypothesis that the word executive has experienced linguistic drift
since the 1700s, coloring the modern understanding of executive
power as it pertains to the President and creating an ambiguity in the
term. Tables 1 and 2 below are illustrative of the shift:
Table 1

Table 2

The above tables map collocates of the word executive—words that
frequently co-occur with the word executive.14 Table 1 provides a list
of words that immediately precede the word executive in Founding Era

14. The choice was made to limit the search to the collocates one to the left of executive in order to
pull modifying adjectives.
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texts,15 whereas Table 2 tracks the same for modern usage.16 The only
word that appears in both lists—chief—is highlighted in grey.
Although a very simple comparison, potential linguistic drift is
immediately apparent from the data. In Table 1, executive’s collocates
largely bear governmental connotations, for example: supreme,
independent, national, and federal. However, the COCA data appear
to be dominated by a private sphere connotation, with collocates such
as senior, marketing, advertising, and corporate. Moreover, a search
of chief executive officer in the COFEA yields only seven results, all
of which refer to the leader of a governmental body.17 On the other
hand, the same phrase in the COCA returns 2,050 results, with the vast
majority of hits referencing leaders of private businesses.18 In fact, in
a random sample of 100 COCA hits, 96% referenced leaders of
business entities.19
This linguistic dichotomy suggests that the modern understanding
of executive power as it pertains to presidential power is perhaps
colored by a usage of the term executive that is exclusive to the modern
age—an understanding that is exemplified by the popular campaign
catchphrase suggesting that the President should “run the government
like a business.”20 In fact, a corpus-based analysis using Google’s book
scanning tool21 shows that the first recorded use of the phrase
“government like a business” appears in the 1920s, with the phrase
15. Table 1 presents data from the COFEA.
16. Table 2 presents data from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), which
contains approximately 560 million words from spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and
academic texts from 1990–2017. Corpus of Contemporary American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG,
https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Nov. 23, 2019)
[hereinafter COCA].
17. COFEA, supra note 11 (search “chief executive officer”).
18. COCA, supra note 16 (search “chief executive officer”).
19. Id. (filter for random sample of 100).
20. See Philip Bump, Trump’s Idea to Run the Government Like a Business Is an Old One in American
POST
(Mar.
27,
2017,
1:42
PM),
Politics,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/03/27/trumps-idea-to-run-the-governmentlike-a-business-is-an-old-one-in-american-politics/?utm_term=.1b4a3feff9fc [https://perma.cc/WA2XJME7] (tracking the use of the phrase “government like a business” between 1800 and the present).
21. The Google Book Ngram Viewer searches a corpus of books over user-selected years. Ngram
Viewer, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams/info [https://perma.cc/ZNV8-3D87] (last
visited Nov. 23, 2019).
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gaining popularity under President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.22
Despite modern political rhetoric’s conflating these two distinct
understandings, or senses, of executive, the original public meaning of
executive power was likely something quite different. And although
the thrust of this paper is not an outright comparison of the modern
framing of executive power with its Founding Era understanding, this
shift in meaning is nevertheless relevant to demonstrating why an
empirical original meaning analysis of executive power is necessary to
fully understand the scope of Article II. To that end, the following
presents data on the frequency and usage of the phrase executive power
during the Founding Era as supporting evidence of the phrase’s
original public meaning.
A. Linguistic Methodology
As a preliminary matter, and as is evidenced by the previous
discussion, executive power is a polysemous phrase; thus, any
meaningful analysis of its usage must recognize and distinguish its
various meanings.23 Corpus linguists differentiate the senses
associated with polysemous words and phrases through a process
called coding.24 During the coding process, a word or phrase is
searched in an electronic database known as a corpus.25 The corpus
search produces key word in context (KWIC) concordance lines
showing snapshots of text containing the searched phrase, thereby
allowing the linguistic researcher to glean the sense of the phrase from
the words around it.26 This method is based on the idea that the
meaning of a word or phrase is dependent on the context in which it is
used—similar to the noscitur a sociis rule of statutory construction in
law.27 Based on review of the KWIC concordance lines, different
22. Id.
23. Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 285. Polysemy occurs when a word is attributed with more than
one sense or meaning. Id.
24. Id. at 293.
25. Id. at 292–93.
26. Id. at 293.
27. Id.; see also Noscitur a Sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A canon of
construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase, esp. one in a list, should be determined
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senses are assigned numbers and search results are categorized
according to which sense they implicate.
Here, the senses of the phrase executive power were coded pursuant
to grounded theory methodology—instead of predetermining set
categories of senses and conforming the data to those categories, the
senses used in this analysis were coded based on the prevailing
meanings that emerged during the data review itself.28 Because of the
amorphous nature of the phrase, and in order to record the most
nuanced results possible while at the same time avoiding confirmation
bias, grounded theory’s more flexible methods were preferable to
rigidly preset categories based on either dictionary definitions or
researcher expectations.29 In particular, permitting the addition of
sense codes proved instrumental in pinpointing the introduction of new
applications and uses of executive power and matching those
developments to historical events.
B. “Executive Power” Frequency Data
The COFEA results for executive power were coded according to
the following six sense categories based on usage patterns that
emerged through ongoing KWIC concordance line review:
(1) As belonging to a single elected governmental leader
(such as a governor or a president);30
(2) As belonging to the head of a private company;31
by the words immediately surrounding it.”).
28. See James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics: Importing
Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus Design
and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589, 1611 (2017). Consistent with accepted methodology, and as a
means of quality assurance, where a new category was created, the previous results were reviewed anew
to ensure that they did not fit better within the newly created sense code.
29. Id. (comparing methods of linguistic sense coding).
30. THOMAS REESE, AN ESSAY ON THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION IN CIVIL SOCIETY 20 (Charleston,
Markland & M’Iver 1788) (“The chief magistrate, who is invested with the supreme executive power, is
bound by oath, faithfully and impartially to execute the laws, and govern agreeably to them.”).
31. Although this connotation did not emerge as a prevailing sense in the COFEA data, it was
nevertheless included as a possibility in light of the modern usage of the term and the notion of linguistic
drift discussed supra Part I.
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(3) As referring to one’s autonomy over oneself (akin to
willpower);32
(4) As belonging to a body of governmental leaders (such as
a council or a legislature);33
(5) As belonging to a king or a hereditary leader;34
(6) As a division of finite governmental power relating to the
allocation of responsibilities between governmental
branches.35
In addition to sense and frequency, the register, or type of source, and
year were also recorded for comparison.
The following chart depicts the normalized frequency results across
registers of the above-described sense coding between 1755 and 1789
by date in five-year increments.36

32. See, e.g., MOSES HEMMENWAY, SEVEN SERMONS, ON THE OBLIGATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT
UNREGENERATE, TO LABOUR FOR THE MEAT WHICH ENDURETH TO EVERLASTING LIFE 19
(Boston, Kneeland & Adams 1767) (“For in this respect, there is no essential difference, between the
unregenerate and the regenerate. The same faculties of understanding and will, and executive power,
physically considered, belong to both. No one I think can or will pretend, that these duties are beyond the
natural ability of a sinner, provided he has a disposition or will to observe them.”).
33. See, e.g., JAMES OTIS, A VINDICATION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY: MORE PARTICULARLY, IN THE LAST SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 48 (Boston, Edes & Gill 1762) (referring to the executive power of the “Governor
and Council,” “However, if this was the only instance that ever had happened of such an exertion of the
executive power by the Governor and Council, it seems to be very applicable to the right of originating
taxes . . . .”).
34. See, e.g., JOSEPH GALLOWAY, A CANDID EXAMINATION OF THE MUTUAL CLAIMS OF
GREAT-BRITAIN, AND THE COLONIES: WITH A PLAN OF ACCOMMODATION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES 15 (New York, G. Wilkie & R. Faulder 1780) (1775) (“The King is that representative; and
as such is vested with the executive power of the British government.”).
35. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 1, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 599, 599 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (“That greatest and most necessary of all
Amendments, the Seperation of the Executive Power, from the Legislative seems to be better understood
than it once was.”).
36. A corresponding table displaying the raw results of this review is attached as Appendix 1.
Additionally, Appendix 2 displays frequency per million in chart form.
OF THE
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Figure 1
Consistently, sense (1) experienced a relatively high rate of usage
as compared to other senses. However, the data show three notable
exceptions. First, between 1760 and 1764, sense (4), referring to a
body of governmental leaders, dominated the usage of executive
power. This usage spike is especially stark when compared to the sense
(4) usage frequency in other time periods, which was often among the
lowest out of the six senses recorded. Second, between 1770 and 1774,
sense (5), referring to the executive power of a king, likewise saw a
spike in usage frequency as compared to other senses during that
timeframe. And between 1785 and 1789, sense (6), referring to the
division and allocation of a finite amount of governmental power,
emerged as a new, discrete sense and was used slightly more
frequently than sense (1). Finally, the absence of any sense (2) use in
Founding Era text is noteworthy, further supporting the notion that
executive power has experienced linguistic drift in the modern age.
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A review of historical events and circumstances helps explain the
statistical anomalies noted above.37 The high frequency usage of sense
(4), occurring in the first part of the 1760s, is possibly attributable to
the structure of many colonial governments. For example,
Massachusetts’s colonial government was comprised of a governor
and an executive council, which were jointly endowed with the
executive power.38 Prior to the formation of the Articles of
Confederation, and subsequently, the Constitution itself, there appears
to have been little discussion of a joint colonial executive power;
rather, reference to executive power apart from the British king was
largely defined by each colony’s governmental structure—some of
which were characterized by executive councils, instead of singular
governors. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that many
of the early-1760s sources in which executive power appeared were
election sermons and political speeches geared toward the politics of
particular colonies, instead of more sophisticated commentaries on the
formation of the American union.39
Progressing chronologically, the spike in the early 1770s of sense
(5) use, referring to the executive power of the king, correlates to the
beginnings of mounting political unrest in the American colonies
aimed at Great Britain. Following the Boston Tea Party in 1773 and
the passage of the Intolerable Acts, the colonists convened the First
Continental Congress in 1774, during which they petitioned King
George III for relief from the oppressive acts of Parliament.40 Thus,
colonial leaders during this time purported loyalty to the king while at
the same time denouncing the acts and authority of the British
Parliament.41 Accordingly, it follows that the usage frequency of
37. The following historical references are meant merely to provide context for the empirical linguistic
data. For an in-depth discussion of the significance of these historical events as they relate to the original
public meaning of “executive power,” see infra Part II.
38. See JAMES OTIS, supra note 33, at 43 (‘“This was an act which the Governor with the Council had
a right to do’ . . . . ‘It was a legal and constitutional exercise of the powers vested in them.’ ‘It was an
exertion of the executive power.’”).
39. See app. 1.
40. Nathan S. Chapman et al., Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1700–02
(2012).
41. As an aside, historical debate surrounds whether the rhetoric of “loyalty to the Crown” was merely

Published by Reading Room,

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9

618

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

executive power referring to the king’s authority to address colonial
concerns would increase as a result of these historical events.
Finally, sense (6) is not seen until the latter half of the final decade
surveyed, with the first recorded use in 1785. The emergence of the
sixth sense, referring to the allocation of finite governmental power,
signifies a shift in the discussion of executive power and the balance
of powers more generally. Whereas the earlier usages focused largely
on the established connotations of executive power as it manifested in
a scheme of government—that is, who wielded the power—by the late
1780s, the conversation was more focused on the proper scope of the
power—that is, what is executive power and how far does it reach. It
is unsurprising then, that this more philosophical use of executive
power coincides with the drafting of the Constitution, the beginning of
the ratification debates, and the rise of the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists.
C. The Semantics of Article II
In addition to the empirical data derived from corpus linguistic
studies, linguistic semantics can also provide insight into the original
public meaning of constitutional phrases.42 Although linguists espouse
different semantic theories, semantic analysis for the purpose of
determining original meaning in the legal context requires a fact-based
inquiry into the “sentence meaning” of the constitutional text.43
lip service espoused by colonial leaders in an attempt to manipulate the common people when what the
colonial leaders really desired was total independence. See Neil L. York, The First Continental Congress
and the Problem of American Rights, 122 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 353, 353 (1998) (referencing
colonial leader Joseph Galloway’s assertion that “[t]he men who had dominated Congress and pushed
through the Declaration of Rights were duping the people and manipulating public opinion”).
Nevertheless, a focus on the secret, private meaning underlying open, public speech is the job of
original-intent originalists. To reach the original public meaning, the words must be taken as they would
have been understood by their public audience, even if that audience were being manipulated.
42. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 28–29 (Univ. of Ill. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244
[https://perma.cc/3PTA-RJRH]. Because the authenticity of constitutional typography and syntax is
largely uncontroverted, this paper assumes that the portions of the Constitution discussed infra are free
from scrivener’s errors and accurately reflect the original constitutional text. See id.
43. Id. at 36–37 (“Meanings in the semantic sense are facts determined by the evidence. They are not
courses of action adopted on the basis of normative concerns.”).
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Whereas scholars of original-intent originalism are concerned with the
speaker’s meaning—that is, what the Framers wanted by using the
phrase executive power—the sentence meaning is the primary concern
of scholars focused on public meaning—that is, what the Framers
actually said according to the ordinary rules of grammar and
construction when they chose to write Article II in the way that they
did.44 By focusing on objective clues, such as sentence structure and
word choice, the resulting linguistic analysis is further removed from
normative considerations and, therefore, is arguably more indicative
of original public meaning.
Notably, the first sections of Articles I, II, and III provide for the
vesting of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
respectively.45 However, the structure of each of these sections is
decidedly different. For example, only Article I qualifies the scope of
the power it vests, stating, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”46 The limiting language
“herein granted” implies that Congress is restricted to exercising only
those legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution. Article II on
the other hand merely notes that “[t]he executive Power shall be
vested” without any similarly restrictive language.47 In fact, Article
II’s Section One is the only of the three not to include qualifying
language, as Article III provides for “[t]he judicial Power of the United
States.”48
Furthermore, the use of the singular form of power in Article II is
significant.49 First, the singular form suggests that executive power is
viewed as a collective unit, as opposed to the fragmented or divisible
sense of legislative power present in Article I.50 And, secondly, the
44. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 120 (1989); see also Solum, supra note 42, at
35 (defining “sentence meaning” as “the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that
constitute the utterance”).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
47. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
49. See Julian D. Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2019).
50. The concept of a singular, natural executive power is reminiscent of early uses of “executive
power” to refer to the hereditary power of the King. See discussion supra Section I.A.

Published by Reading Room,

13

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9

620

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

singular form in the context of the sentence implies that the entirety of
the executive power is vested in the President, again standing in stark
contrast to the apportioned grant of legislative power in Article I.
Indeed, these purposeful distinctions are highlighted in some of the
earliest Federalist interpretations of the constitutional scope of the
executive power. In John Adams’s 1789 notes from a congressional
discussion of the President’s removal powers, he noted, “There is an
explicit grant of Power to the President . . . . The Executive Power is
granted—not the Executive Powers hereinafter enumerated and
explained.”51 Similarly, in his 1791 Pacificus essays, Alexander
Hamilton cited the syntactical composition of Article II in defense of
his argument for an expansive executive power, relying heavily on
“[t]he different mode of expression employed in the constitution in
regard to the [legislative and the executive powers].”52 This early
attention to syntactic and typographical interpretation by the Founders
themselves further supports the importance of semantic linguistic
analysis in deciphering constitutional meaning.

51. Adams, supra note 3, at 218 (discussing the scope of the President’s removal power).
52. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-1502-0038 [https://perma.cc/TBE4-87HJ]. Relevantly, Hamilton explains:
It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider this enumeration
of particular authorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in
the general clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or
qualifications. . . . The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in
regard to the two powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this
inference. In the article which grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the
expressions are—”All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the UStates;” in that which grants the Executive Power the expressions are, as
already quoted “The Executive Po⟨wer⟩ shall be vested in a President of the UStates of
America.” . . . The enumeration ought rather therefore to be considered as intended by
way of greater caution, to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in the
definition of Executive Power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that
power, interpreted in conformity to other parts ⟨of⟩ the constitution and to the principles
of free government. The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the Executive
Power of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to
the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the instrument.
Id. Hamilton’s essays were published in newspapers and, thus, were widely available to the public. Patrick
J. Garrity, The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS (Sept. 23, 2013),
https://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-pacificus-helvidius-debates/
[https://perma.cc/E8NK3RWW].
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Interestingly, however, the strict textual reading of Article II
avowed by the Federalists in support of their arguments for an
expansive executive vested in a singular President seems somewhat at
odds with the corpus linguistic data previously discussed—in
particular the high frequency usage of sense (4) referring to a shared
executive power.53 Accordingly, although the syntax of the final
version of Article II’s grant of executive power does facially suggest a
general grant of power “subject only to the exceptions and
qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the [Constitution],”54 the
frequency data suggest that the public’s understanding of the executive
power may not have been limited to such a discrete and
compartmentalized allocation.55 Indeed, the New Jersey Plan
presented at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 referred to an
elected “federal Executive to consist of [some number of] persons” and
consistently refers to a plural number of executives.56 And even the
competing Virginia Plan, which advocated a single executive,
nevertheless suggested a shared executive power. For example, the
Virginia Plan outlined an executive council of sorts that would
function as a check on the legislature, proposing that “the Executive
and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose
a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the
National Legislature before it shall operate.”57
Moreover, as noted above, sense (4) usage often aligned with
references to colonial governmental structures.58 Similarly, parallels to
these governments were drawn by political leaders at the
Constitutional Convention, suggesting that colonial executive
structures influenced the way in which the Framers understood the
power of the executive. For example, James Madison recorded in his
account of the Constitutional Convention debates a commentary on
53. See discussion supra Section I.B.
54. Hamilton, supra note 52.
55. See OTIS, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56. Madison Debates: June 15, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
debates_615.asp#9 [https://perma.cc/JRD3-W4LV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
57. Madison Debates: May 29, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
debates_529.asp#rand [https://perma.cc/KXV9-MVNA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (emphasis added).
58. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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Federalist delegate James Wilson’s advocacy for a single executive
power, noting the fact that colonial governments often shared
executive power between a chief magistrate and a council:
[I]n each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of
the Govt. It was so [Mr. Wilson] admitted, and properly so,
and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Govt.
But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there
was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate
could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the
establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the
King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its
advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence
of the people.59
In addition to the governmental structures of the colonies, many
other iterations of shared executive power were proposed and debated
at the Convention.60 And interestingly, early versions of Article II
contemplating a single executive were often characterized by
extremely limited language, more similar to the final version of Article
I. Importantly, the final draft of Article II that was produced by the
Constitutional Convention and presented to the Committee of Detail
provided:

59. Madison
Debates:
June
4,
AVALON
PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_604.asp [https://perma.cc/HBF5-2JN5] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019). It is of further note that the chief magistrate in these colonial governments lacked
significant executive authority and, accordingly, was essentially powerless outside of the authority granted
to him by the colony’s legislature. Letter from Joseph Reed to George Washington (May 17, 1781), in
The Washington Papers, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/9901-02-05811 [https://perma.cc/3ZA7-AEKZ] (stating that the legislature’s refusal to authorize the
colonial executive’s emergency power left the executive in a “state of imbecility” and “without
powers . . . to answer the publick expectations”).
60. E.g.,
Madison
Debates:
June
6,
AVALON
PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_606.asp [https://perma.cc/P6WN-F8BB] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019) (proposing that the executive power be shared “with a convenient number of the National
Judiciary”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss5/9

16

Miller and Obelgoner: Effective but Limited: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the Origin

2020]

EFFECTIVE BUT LIMITED

623

That a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single
person, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term
of seven years, to be ineligible a second time, with power to
carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices
in cases not otherwise provided for, to be removable on
impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of
duty, to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his
time to the public service, to be paid out of the national
treasury.61
Here, the structure of the proposal provides for a “national
executive . . . with power to [perform certain tasks],” standing in stark
contrast to the final version of Article II which vests “the executive
power” as a single, all-encompassing unit in the President. Thus, early
versions of Article II point out a subtle linguistic tension between the
meaning and usage of the word power—that is, power meaning the
duty to complete specific acts versus power as a grant of discretionary
authority. And although the latter meaning is seemingly memorialized
in the final text of Article II, the robust debate surrounding the
allocation of executive power and the draft produced by the
Convention at large calls into question whether, as a matter of public
meaning, the plain text of Article II created by the Committee of Detail
aligns with the way the phrase was understood in Founding Era
discourse.62
61. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787:
AN EFFORT TO TRACE THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EACH SEPARATE CLAUSE FROM ITS FIRST
SUGGESTION IN THAT BODY TO THE FORM FINALLY APPROVED 197–98 (1900). Other early versions of
provisions reminiscent of Article II contained similarly limited language. See, e.g., Madison Debates:
June
13,
AVALON
PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_613.asp
[https://perma.cc/R68D-QBGH] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019); Madison Debates: June 18, AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_618.asp [https://perma.cc/XC5D-DKGW]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (stating “[t]he authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows”);
Madison Debates: June 19, AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_619.asp
[https://perma.cc/9APP-U4BP] (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
62. This conclusion is further bolstered by evidence that the final language of Article II is the product
of committees, which were heavily influenced by three key Federalists and not larger Convention-wide
debate. Morton J. Frisch, Executive Power and Republican Government–1787, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 281, 282 (1987). Scholars have pointed to this evidence as a means to argue that the seemingly broad
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II. Historical Analysis
The corpus linguistic data discussed above demonstrates that the
meaning of the phrase executive power evolved somewhat in the
decades before the drafting of the Constitution. The shifting senses of
the phrase, as mentioned above, correlate with events and
circumstances in the Founding Era, the outcomes of which influenced
future meanings of the phrase. Thus, without an understanding of the
historical backdrop against which these meanings evolved, the
empirical data alone is meaningless.
So, it stands to reason that, in attempting to define the phrase, courts
and scholars alike generally cannot, and arguably should not, dispense
with an analysis of colonial American history leading up to the
American Revolution. These analyses often focus on the colonists’
supposed rebellion against King George III and the Framers’
subsequent attempts to rein in the power of the executive branch to
prevent the rise of a king-like executive.63 However, some historians
contend that the colonists rebelled not against the Crown but against
Parliament.64 And of course, convincing evidence exists to support
both positions; indeed, it appears that even the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention disagreed as to the impetus for the colonial
rebellion.65 The following analysis proceeds on the theory that neither
view was ascribed to universally—that some colonists believed they
language of the vesting clause was a deliberate attempt by Federalist drafters to sneak in broad language
that could later be used to justify an expansive executive authority. See, e.g., Thomas S. Langston &
Michael E. Lind, John Locke and the Limits of Presidential Prerogative, 24 POLITY 49, 53–54 (1991).
63. Interestingly, some decisions argue the exact opposite—that the Framers had no intention of
weakening the power of the executive. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698–99 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“The major ‘fortification’ provided [to the executive branch], of course, was the veto
power. But in addition to providing fortification, the Founders conspicuously and very consciously
declined to sap the Executive’s strength in the same way they had weakened the Legislature: by dividing
the executive power.”).
64. See, e.g., ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION 2 (2014). Nelson posits that “[t]he American
Revolution, unlike the two seventeenth-century English revolutions and the French Revolution, was—for
a great many of its protagonists—a revolution against a legislature, not against a king. It was, indeed, a
rebellion in favor of royal power.” Id.
65. See id. at 1. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, in response to the proposal to vest the executive power
in one person, remarked that the Americans, “having just rebelled against the British Crown, had ‘no
motive to be governed by the British Government as our prototype.’” Id. James Wilson of Pennsylvania
responded that “[t]he people of America did not oppose the British King but the parliament—the
opposition was not against an Unity but a corrupt multitude.” Id.
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were rebelling against the king, while others believed they were
rebelling against Parliament—and argues that the original meaning of
executive power must be informed not only by the more immediate
events leading up to the American Revolution, but also by
contemporary political theory and events in British history that shaped
early Americans’ understanding of the phrase. To that end, it is helpful
to briefly consider the relevant theory and events in order to
contextualize Founding Era discussions of executive power.
A. Executive Power in Theory and in Practice
The Framers and colonial Americans as a whole were certainly
familiar with and influenced by the political theorists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though the works of three such
theorists—John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau—figure more prominently in the discussion of executive
power than others.66 A more thorough discussion of their writings can
be found elsewhere; here, we simply wish to introduce the basic
principles of these theorists, focusing on their treatment of the
executive power and recurrent themes present in the works that later
surfaced in the American discourse.
1. John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
First published in 1689, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
begins with the proposition that all men are subject to the laws of
nature, but within the confines of those laws, men are free to act as
they see fit and to do with their property as they wish.67 However,
66. It is worth noting that the works of William Blackstone were also influential. Indeed, Sir Edmund
Burke of the House of Commons, a leading proponent of the colonists’ cause in Parliament, commented
on the ubiquity of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Common Law in the American colonies, asserting
that as many copies of the treatise were sold in the colonies as in England. ERIC STOCKDALE & RANDY J.
HOLLAND, MIDDLE TEMPLE LAWYERS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15 (2007). However,
Blackstone was greatly influenced by the works of Montesquieu—so much so that scholars have
commented that Blackstone’s “plagiarism ‘would be nauseating if it were not comic.’” M. J. C. VILE ,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 112 (1967). Thus, we have elected not to include
in this article a separate analysis of Blackstone’s influence on the colonists.
67. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 122 (Thomas L. Cook ed., Hafner Publ’g Co.
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natural law prohibits any man from harming the life, health, liberty, or
possessions of any other man.68 In the natural state, man has two
powers: the power to do whatever is necessary for the preservation of
self and of others and the power to punish crimes committed in
violation of natural law.69 Locke describes this power to punish as the
means by which the execution of the law of nature is accomplished.70
To move from the state of nature into civil society, individuals must
relinquish a portion of that power possessed in the natural state; the
first power, “he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society,”
and the second he relinquishes in its entirety to “the executive power
of the society.”71 For Locke, laws governing a society cannot be
enacted without the consent of that society; the legislative power is
derived from the people, who must grant that power voluntarily.72 The
legislature is created by “the first and fundamental . . . law” of any
society and has only so much power as the members of that society
have conveyed to it.73 And to ensure that the laws enacted by the
legislature have teeth, “there should be a power always in being which
should see to the execution of the laws that are made and remain in
force.”74 Locke emphasizes that the legislative and executive powers
must be separate in order to prevent those who enact the laws from
exempting themselves “from obedience to the laws they make, and
suit[ing] the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage.”75

1947) (1689).
68. Id. at 123.
69. Id. at 185.
70. Id. at 124.
71. Id. at 185–86.
72. Id. at 188, 193. “[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains
still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative when they find the legislative act
contrary to the trust reposed in them . . . .” LOCKE, supra note 67, at 196.
73. Id. at 188–89 (“[F]or [the legislative] being but the joint power of every member of the society
given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state
of nature before they entered into society and gave up to the community.”).
74. Id. at 195.
75. Id. at 194.
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Thus begins Locke’s earnest analysis of the executive power.76 At
its core, the executive power is simply the power to execute the laws.77
Ultimately, Locke posits that the executive’s primary aims are to
protect the people’s property and to promote the public good. Indeed,
when the people turn over their natural executive power to their
government, a contract is created, by which the executive agrees to
further these goals.78 Where the executive neglects these aims or
otherwise acts contrary to his agreement with the people, then the
executive has forfeited his authority, and the executive power reverts
to the people.79
2. Baron de Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws
Building on Locke, Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws, writes
that all men are subject to the laws of nature, although Montesquieu
holds that man in his natural state feels nothing but impotence,
weakness, and fear.80 Men lose this weakness and fear upon entering
society, which cannot exist absent some form of government.81 And
again, like Locke, Montesquieu identifies two categories of power
present in every government: legislative power and executive power.82
He subdivides executive power into executive power over foreign
affairs and executive power to execute laws. 83 The first type of
executive power, that over foreign affairs, encompasses the powers to
make peace and war, send and receive ambassadors, establish the

76. Locke notes that a third power, which he terms the federative power, exists in every government.
This power “contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all
persons and communities without the commonwealth.” Id. at 195. According to Locke, the federative
power and the executive power are almost always united; to place the powers in the hands of two distinct
persons or bodies runs the risk that those two persons might act separately, resulting in “disorder and
ruin.” Id. at 196.
77. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 195.
78. Id. at 246.
79. Id. at 246–47.
80. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU 1, 5–6 (London, T. Evans 1777).
81. Id. at 6–7.
82. Id. at 16.
83. Id. at 198.

Published by Reading Room,

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9

628

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

public security, and protect the society against invasion.84
Montesquieu further subdivides the latter type of executive power into
the power to execute the laws—termed the executive power of the
state—which is employed to punish crimes, and the judiciary power,
which is used to resolve disputes between individuals.85 While
Montesquieu emphasizes the necessity of the separation of these
powers to protect against arbitrary action on the part of any one of the
three powers,86 he also proffers that the executive should have, in the
form of the legislative veto, the power to stop any encroachments made
by the legislature.87 Interestingly, this power does not cut both ways:
Montesquieu posits that “as the execution has its natural limits, it is
useless to confine it.”88 Instead, the legislature has some authority to
direct the power of the executive and a right to assess the means by
which the executive is executing the laws.89 He identifies potential
danger “[i]f the legislature leaves the executive power in possession of
a right to imprison those subjects who can give security for their good
behaviour,”90 thereby implying that, while the executive has the
discretion to imprison citizens as it sees fit, the legislature has the right
to curb that discretion.91 Montesquieu also identifies several specific
84. This power is analogous to Locke’s federative power. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
85. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 198.
86. As Montesquieu explains:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest
the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.
Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 209. In Montesquieu’s view, this power is necessary to ensure the preservation of the
executive’s prerogative. Id. However, because the executive should have no share in the legislative power
other than the power to veto, Montesquieu notes that the executive should exclude itself from public
debates and should not propose legislation. Id. at 210.
88. Id. at 206.
89. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 207. Although the legislature has the power to examine the way
in which the executive executes the laws, it has no power to judge the person of the executive himself. Id.
90. Id. at 201.
91. Id. Montesquieu also holds that the legislature can authorize the executive to imprison persons
suspected of conspiring against the state. Id. at 201–02.
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powers, which serve as checks on the other branches, reserved to the
executive.92
3. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract
Finally, in his Social Contract, Rousseau expresses the view that
citizens of a society comprise the sovereign power of the society and
that people exercise a “general will” to direct the state to further the
“common good.”93 As part of this sovereign power, the people have
entered into a social contract, the aim of which is to “defend and
protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each
associate.”94 This sovereignty, secured by the social contract, is both
inalienable and indivisible.95 But unlike Locke and Montesquieu,
Rousseau rejects the idea of the separation of powers96—the sovereign,
again, is indivisible—but he accepts the fact that the functions of the
government are, in fact, distinguishable.97 These functions are the
executive power and the legislative power.98
In Rousseau’s view, the legislative power is supreme;99 it constitutes
the general will of the people, and only from this general will can the
law radiate.100 The executive power, on the other hand, “is only the
92. These powers include the executive’s prerogative to regulate the assemblage of the legislature and
to command the society’s army. Id. at 207, 211. According to Montesquieu, the legislature should not be
assembled indefinitely. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 80, at 207, 211. Such a circumstance, he posits, would
deprive the executive of much of its work and leave it with too little to do, resulting in an executive
obsessed with consolidating and defending its power. Id. at 210.
93. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 22 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M.
Dent & Sons Ltd. & E.P. Dutton & Co. 1913) (1762).
94. Id. at 14. Blackstone alluded to the idea of a contract between the executive and the society over
which it presides, explaining that, in exchange for the executive’s protecting the community, every
individual in that community owes a duty and allegiance. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*236.
95. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 18–19.
96. Id. at 17.
97. VILE, supra note 66, at 115.
98. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 23.
99. Id. at 78. “The legislative power is the heart of the State; the executive power is its brain, which
causes the movement of all the parts.” Id. Rousseau goes on to note that, while a person can survive
without his brain, once his heart ceases to function, the person dies. Similarly, a government can survive
with a “paralyzed” brain, i.e., an incapacitated executive, but, without its heart—the legislature—the
government is doomed. Id.
100. Id. (“The Sovereign, having no force other than the legislative power, acts only by means of the
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force that is applied to give the law effect.”101 Government, then, is
“the legitimate exercise of the executive power, and [the] prince or
magistrate the man or the body entrusted with that administration.”102
Like Montesquieu, Rousseau is emphatic in his belief that the
executive should have no part in the functions of the legislature.103
These three works share common threads that exerted significant
influence on Americans, both before and after the Revolutionary War.
First and foremost was the idea that executive power, at its most
fundamental, is the power to execute the laws. Americans’
understanding of executive power fused various concepts drawn from
these philosophers—most prominently, an aversion to the application
of arbitrary power and an acknowledgment of a social contract—
shaped and refined by recent events, both in the colonies and at home
in Britain. In the eyes of the colonists, the king, in whom the executive
power vested, was the father of his people and the guardian of their
rights and liberties.104 The king derived his power from a contract with
laws . . . .”).
101. Id. at 84. This language appears numerous times in the ratification debates.
102. ROUSSEAU, supra note 93, at 50.
103. Id. at 36–37. In this regard, Rousseau echoes those concerns expressed by Montesquieu:
[F]or if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws,
he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his
laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate
his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work.
....
He, therefore, who draws up the laws has, or should have, no right of legislation,
and the people cannot, even if it wishes, deprive itself of this incommunicable right,
because, according to the fundamental compact, only the general will can bind the
individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular will is in conformity with
the general will, until it has been put to the free vote of the people.
Id.
104. Perhaps drawing from Locke’s idea that fathers exert authority over their children by the vestiges
of “that executive power of the law of nature which every free man naturally hath,” the American colonists
often analogized the king to a father. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 157. As the father of his people, the king
had a duty to respect the rights and liberties of his people, but, because he wore the crown, his duty
extended beyond merely respecting those rights—he was required to defend them. This duty flowed from
the king’s compact with his people, as evidenced by his coronation oath. See JOHN ALLEN ET AL., THE
AMERICAN ALARM, OR THE BOSTONIAN PLEA, FOR THE RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES, OF THE PEOPLE 6
(Boston, D. Kneeland & N. Davis 1773) (“[T]he prosperity of the people intirely depends upon . . . the
King’s preserving inviolable firm (according to his coronation oath) the laws, rights and previledges of
the subjects . . . .”); John Hancock, Oration Delivered at Boston (Mar. 5, 1774), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 12, 13 (H. Niles ed., Baltimore, William Ogden Niles 1822) (“[T]hose
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the people in which he promised to preserve their laws, rights, and
privileges.105 When the king wielded this power in an arbitrary
manner, that is, however he so pleased,106 the contract between the
king and his people was destroyed—the king no longer held the
executive power.107
4. A (Brief) History of Monarchical Overreach
Kings Charles I, James II, and, later, George III shared an
experience that makes them unique among British monarchs—a forced
relinquishment of power (or at least some of that power).108 The crux
of the charges levied against both Charles and James boiled down to
essentially identical accusations—misuse of the executive power and
the royal prerogatives109 in violation of their contracts with their
people—which later served as the framework upon which the
Declaration of Independence was based.
In 1626, Charles I invoked his royal prerogative to dissolve
Parliament and, seeking funding for a potential war with Spain, to
unilaterally levy subsidies against his people “in the guise of a forced
rights and liberties which, as a father, [King George III] ought ever to regard, and as a king, he is bound,
in honor, to defend from violations, even at the risk of his own life.”); MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S
APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD (1775), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, 1, 452 (Ellis Sandoz ed., Liberty Fund 2d ed. 1998) (“[T]he king’s coronation
oath, whereby he swears to protect his subjects in all their just rights, to abjure popery, and maintain the
protestant religion, to govern the kingdom and administer justice according to the laws of the realm.”)
(emphasis added).
105. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 157–58.
106. Locke defines the exercise of arbitrary power as “governing without settled standing laws.” Id. at
190.
107. See, e.g., Samuel Sherwood, Scriptural Instructions to Civil Rulers (1774), in POLITICAL SERMONS
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra note 104, at 383.
Subjects have rights, privileges and properties; and are countenanced and supported by
the law of nature, the laws of society, and the law of God; in demanding full protection
in the enjoyment of these rights, and the impartial distribution of justice, from their
rulers. And when rulers refuse these, and will not comply with such a reasonable and
equitable demand from the subject; the society is dissolved; and its fundamental laws
violated and broken; and the relation between the ruler and the subject ceases, with all
the duties and obligations that arose from it.
Id.
108. Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 274, 280, 283 (2009).
109. Id. at 280.
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loan.”110 Those who refused to comply were imprisoned.111 After a
brief reinstatement in 1628, Charles again, pursuant to his prerogative
power, dissolved Parliament.112 When Parliament was recalled in
1640, Charles found himself on the receiving end of significant
outrage, culminating in his being accused of treason, tried, found
guilty, and subsequently executed.113 The court’s sentence read as a
laundry list of Charles’s crimes, which he committed ostensibly for
“the advancement and upholding of the personal interest of will,
power, and pretended prerogative to himself and his family, against
the public interest, common right, liberty, justice, and peace of the
people.”114 Most of the specific crimes of which Charles was found
guilty related to his waging war against his own subjects, resulting in
the deaths of thousands and the wastage of both public and private
monies.115 The sentence though focused in large part on Charles’s
abridgement of his people’s rights and liberties, as well as his
concurrent failure to protect those rights and liberties in violation of
his contract with the people.
Following the eleven-year interlude during which the
Commonwealth of England was both established and dissolved, the

110. Nicholas Tyacke, The Puritan Paradigm of English Politics, 1558–1642, 53 HIST. J. 527, 543
(2010).
111. Kenneth Shipps, The “Political Puritan,” 45 CHURCH HIST. 196, 201 (1976). This episode resulted
in a seminal case in British legal history, the Five Knights Case, so named for the five knights imprisoned
on Charles’s orders for refusal to submit to the forced loan. The knights petitioned the Court of King’s
Bench for writs of habeas corpus to secure release from their confinement, which had been accomplished
“per speciale mandatum Domini Regis,” or by special command of the king. Darnel’s Case (1627) 3
Cobbett’s St. Tr. 1 (K.B.) 9. Appearing on behalf of the king, the Attorney General argued that the
monarch possessed an unlimited power to imprison people as he saw fit and that “it [was] part of the
king’s prerogative that he can do no wrong.” Id. at 44.
112. Charles offered an explanation for the dissolution but prefaced this explanation with the
now-familiar sentiment that “princes are not bound to give account of their actions, but to God alone.”
The King’s Declaration Showing the Causes of the Late Dissolution (Mar. 10, 1621), in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625–1660, 83, 83 (Samuel Rawson
Gardiner ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1889).
113. The Death Warrant of Charles I (Jan. 29, 1648), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 394, 394 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens eds., Macmillan Co.
1901).
114. Sentence of the High Court of Justice upon Charles I (Jan. 27, 1648), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 113, at 392.
115. Id. at 393.
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Stuart monarchy was restored to the throne.116 This short-lived
restoration saw Charles II, son of Charles I, ascend to the throne,
followed by his brother James II, who ruled for only three years before
his abdication.117 But in those three years, James’s abuse of the royal
prerogatives aroused the disdain of his subjects, specifically in regard
to his efforts to reestablish his chosen faith—Roman Catholicism—in
Britain.118 In furtherance of that goal, James exercised his prerogative
to suspend all penal laws concerning ecclesiastical matters and to
pardon his subjects for crimes committed in violation of those penal
laws.119 Shortly thereafter, James, unlike his father, vacated his throne
rather than wait for Parliament to remove him, although his voluntary
abdication did nothing to dissuade Parliament from publicly airing its
grievances against the former king.120 Upon the ascension of James’s
successors, William and Mary of Orange, Parliament passed the
English Bill of Rights, which, before asserting the rights and liberties
of the British citizens, laid out those offenses of which James was
purportedly guilty.121 These offenses included dispensing with and
suspending of laws without parliamentary consent, invoking his
prerogative to levy money for his own use contrary to the express
direction of Parliament, raising and keeping a standing army and
quartering soldiers without parliamentary consent, inflicting “illegal
and cruel punishments,” and imposing excessive fines, all in support
116. Henry G. Roseveare, Charles II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-II-king-of-Great-Britain-and-Ireland
[https://perma.cc/VW4A-PHJZ].
117. John P. Kenyon, James II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-II-king-of-England-Scotland-and-Ireland
[https://perma.cc/K2KG-4HYN].
118. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 178 (2009).
119. 6 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1388–89 (London, T.C. Hansard 1806).
120. 5 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803, at 64 (London, T.C. Hansard 1809).
121. The Bill of Rights (Dec. 16, 1689), in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY, supra note 114, at 463. In an earlier resolution, the House of Commons declared that James
“endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, by breaking the original Contract between king
and people, and, by the advice of Jesuits, and other wicked persons, having violated the fundamental
Laws, and having withdrawn himself out of this Kingdom, has abdicated the Government . . .” COBBETT,
supra note 120.
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of an effort “to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the
laws and liberties of this kingdom.”122
B. Executive Power as Understood by Founding Era Americans
As explained in Part I, beginning in 1762, the phrase executive
power appeared with much greater frequency, albeit with fluctuations,
in Founding Era publications.123 Corresponding with greater intrusions
upon their rights and liberties by the British government, and with the
seventeenth-century abuses of power by the monarchy undergirding
the discussion,124 the colonists became more concerned with theories
of government and personal liberty. As indicated by the corpus
linguistic data, discussion of executive power remained confined to a
relatively narrow sense of the phrase—as belonging to a single
governmental leader—until about 1760. The data show that, around
that time, the sense of the phrase expanded to include reference to a
body of governmental leaders, and as discussed in Part I, this new
sense likely resulted from increased attention to the power wielded by
those bodies.
According to John Adams, the year 1761 marked the
commencement of the long struggle for American independence, with
Boston attorney James Otis firing the (figurative) first shot. The
impetus for this mutiny: the exercise of power in a clearly arbitrary
manner by the Crown’s colonial representatives. Otis was solicited to
represent a number of Boston merchants in regard to their objection to
the issuance of a writ of assistance to a customs agent.125 In the eyes
122. The Bill of Rights, supra note 114.
123. See supra Figure 1.
124. Ellis Sandoz, Foreword to 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805,
supra note 104, at xi, xxi. Colonial American discourse was riddled with cautionary reference to Kings
Charles I and James II. Id. For instance, January 30 was observed annually as the execution day of Charles
I, and November 5, 1788, the anniversary of William and Mary of Orange’s arrival in Britain, was marked
with century sermons excoriating governmental abuse of power and praising the vindication of individual
rights and liberties. Id. Moreover, a favorite tack of propagandists was to invoke the abuses committed by
Charles I and James II while comparing those abuses with those of George III. Id.
125. James M. Farrell, The Writs of Assistance and Public Memory: John Adams and the Legacy of
James Otis, 79 NEW ENG. Q. 533, 535–36 (2006). The Navigation Act passed by the British Parliament
prohibited the colonists from engaging in trade with any country besides Great Britain; naturally, the
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of many American colonists, these writs invaded upon their personal
liberties to be secure in their homes, and Otis argued as much to the
court.126 In Otis’s view, such a writ was “the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the
fundamental principles of law.”127 He also took the opportunity to
emphasize that Charles I’s exercise of such arbitrary power had
resulted in Charles’s losing his head.128 The issuance of these writs
infringed upon “one of the most essential branches of English liberty[,]
the freedom of one’s house,” which Otis implied to be a liberty
guaranteed by the British Constitution.129 Otis concluded his speech
with the then-novel but now-familiar argument that an “act against the
Constitution is void,” in other words, that the legislature lacks the
power to pass acts in violation of the Constitution.130 Adams, a
firsthand witness to Otis’s masterful oration, declared in later writings
that “American independence was then and there born; the seeds of
patriots and heroes was then and there sown. . . . Then and there was
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain.”131 In the words of both Otis and Adams, we can see the
development of one of the colonists’ main complaints against
Britain—the wielding of power in a plainly arbitrary manner.
In 1762, Otis published his first political pamphlet wherein he
sought to assert for the legislative body the singular authority to levy
taxes and approve expenditures of public funds.132 He explained that
colonists sought to skirt this legislation, and many traders engaged in the smuggling of goods. ROBERT P.
ST. JOHN & RAYMOND L. NOONAN, LANDMARKS OF LIBERTY: THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
IDEALS AS RECORDED IN SPEECHES FROM OTIS TO HUGHES 4 (Robert P. St. John & Raymond L. Noonan
eds., 2d ed. 1922). In an effort to combat smuggling, the British employed writs of assistance, which were
issued by courts and allowed customs agents to search the homes of persons suspected of smuggling
without first demonstrating probable cause to a magistrate. Farrell, supra. The controversy surrounding
these writs was considered by the Supreme Court and informed its opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886).
126. ST. JOHN & NOONAN, supra note 125.
127. James Otis, Writs of Assistance, in LANDMARKS OF LIBERTY, supra note 125, at 6.
128. Id. at 7.
129. 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, app. A, at 524 (Boston, Little, Brown,
& Co. 1865). Otis, supra note 127, at 8.
130. ADAMS, supra note 129, at 522.
131. ST. JOHN & NOONAN, supra note 125, at 5.
132. OTIS, supra note 33, at 31–33. In Otis’s view, the governor usurped this power when he authorized
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the governor and his council, when the legislature was in recess,
asserted that they had “a right to do what they judge ‘the supreme
law,’. . . for ‘the safety of the people being the supreme law, should at
all events . . . be provided for.’ This is a short method to put it in the
power of the Governor and Council, to do as they please . . . .”133 In
Otis’s view, the dogma espoused by the governor was merely a method
by which to excuse the arbitrary use of his executive power—akin to
the Lockean notion of executive prerogative—which, according to
Otis, “in plain English means no more than to do as one pleases.”134
Essentially, to exercise power arbitrarily is to exercise power without
limitation.135
Complaints and concerns about the arbitrary use of power found
their way into other discussions, both contemporary to Otis and later.
Often, the exercise of arbitrary power was referred to as a violation of
the fundamental laws.136 An executive can violate fundamental laws in
numerous ways, but the crux of the violation comes from the
executive’s encroachment either upon powers reserved to another
branch of government or upon personal liberties the people did not
cede to the government:

the expenditure of funds to pay the costs of providing protection to a fishery. Id at 33. In response, the
Massachusetts House of Representatives issued a Remonstrance to the governor, accusing him of taking
from the House “their most darling priviledge, the right of originating all Taxes.” Id. at 15. As Owens
portentously surmised in his preface, “The world ever has been and will be pretty equally divided, between
those two great parties, vulgarly called the winners, and the loosers; or to speak more precisely, between
those who are discontented that they have no Power, and those who never think they can have enough.”
Id. at iv.
133. Id. at 38–39.
134. Id. at 39.
135. John Phillip Reid, In Legitimate Strips: The Concept of “Arbitrary,” the Supremacy of Parliament,
and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 459, 461–62 (1977). Charges of tyranny
often appeared in conjunction with accusations of arbitrariness. Id. Tyranny invokes an idea of unlimited
power. Id.
136. Fundamental laws are
laws relating to personal liberty, the privileges of the subject, and the powers of the
magistrate—to private property and the execution of justice—to the punishment of
evil-doers and the preservation of the public peace—to marriage, education, religion,
and the rights of conscience—to the public forms, and order of government—and to
the revenues and taxes, by which the state is supported.
Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union and Happiness Considered and Recommended (1787), in
1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730–1805, supra note 104, at 913, 918.
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[I]f people must propose conditions unto kings to be by them
acquiesced in, and submitted unto, at their admission to the
government, which thereupon becomes the fundamental
laws of the government, and security for the peoples rights
and liberties, giving a law claim to the people to pursue the
king, in case of failing in the main and principle thing
covenanted, as their own covenanted mandatarius, who hath
no right or authority of his own, but what he hath from them,
and no more power but what is contained in the conditions
upon which he undertaketh the government.137
In other words, the executive wields only so much power as the
people relinquish to him, and, in exchange, he agrees to submit to the
people’s conditions, which become the fundamental laws. For the
colonists, encroachments on such fundamental laws included levying
money, keeping a standing army in time of peace, quartering soldiers
in violation of the law and without the legislature’s consent, and
interfering with free elections.138
As the Revolution drew nearer, colonial discussions of executive
power shifted yet again, as indicated by the linguistic data, to center
on considerations of the king’s executive power. The colonists’
complaints against King George III were numerous, but the thrust of
their argument in favor of independence was a familiar one: the king’s
abdication of his duty to protect the colonists’ rights and liberties in
violation of their mutual contract,139 his abuse of the prerogatives

137. Defensive Arms Vindicated (1783), in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA,
1730–1805, supra note 104, at 712, 736–37 (emphasis added).
138. William Henry Drayton, Judge Drayton’s Charge (Apr. 23, 1776), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF
THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 104, at 72, 76. Drayton notes that these encroachments were
all committed by King James II prior to his being overthrown, and all amounted to violations of the
fundamental laws. Id. As Drayton clarifies, “he did those things without consent of the legislative
assembly chosen by the PERSONAL ELECTION of that people, over whom such doings were exercised.” Id.
139. William Henry Drayton, Another—By Judge Drayton (Oct. 15, 1776), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, supra note 104, at 79, 82 (“[T]he British king, by his hostilities, had as
far as he personally could, absolved America from that faith, allegiance and subjection she owed him;
because the law of our land expressly declares, these are due only in return for his protection, allegiance
being founded on the benefit of protection.”).
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bestowed upon him, and his exercise of arbitrary power.140 In 1776,
these complaints were consolidated in the Declaration of
Independence. Among the colonists’ grievances were the king’s
refusal to “assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the
public good,” dissolution of legislative bodies and refusal to call for
the election of new representatives, taxation of the colonies without
their consent, placement of restrictions on the colonists’ trade,
maintenance of a standing army without the colonies’ consent, and
encroachment on the judiciary.141
Given the reaction to the perceived abuses of power by the monarch,
it is not surprising that, when the time came to develop a new system
of government, the conversation’s focus shifted from considerations
of who wielded the executive power to how that power should be
allocated.142 By the time this sense appeared in the public discourse,
Founding Era Americans understood the executive power to
encompass, at its most fundamental, the power to execute those laws.
Certain prerogatives were traditionally held by the British executive
(that is, the monarch), but unlike the power to execute the law, the
executive prerogative could be both granted and constrained by the
people—the people defined the bounds of the prerogative.143
140. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
141. Id. paras. 3, 7, 17.
142. This shift is illustrated in a letter penned by John Adams to Thomas Brand Hollis in 1787:
All I can Say is that it appears plain to me that every great Nation must have three
Branches or but one. And if it has but one, that one must be a Simple Monarchy or in
other Words a Despotism. A Government of one assembly or of two assemblies only
in any great nation, cannotexist but in a State of civil War that will soon end in
Despotism, of one Man. I am not Solicitous about the Name of the first Magistrate,
provided he have the whole Executive Power. call him Podesta, President,
Consul, anything, as you will.—Anything Sir! I am not afraid of the Word.
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Brand Hollis (Oct. 18, 1787), in The Adams Papers, FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=podesta&s=1111311111&sa=&r=1&sr=
[https://perma.cc/BZC8-LN5F].
143. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mary Carolyn Waldrep ed., 2014)
(“As incident to the undefined power of making war an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles
II had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. . . . At the
revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of Rights
then framed that ‘the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with
the consent of Parliament, was against law.’”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra, at 677 (Alexander
Hamilton) (“It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations
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Prerogative, then, was distinct, and thus divisible, from executive
power.144 Importantly, prerogative should not be conflated with
discretion; executive power was understood to afford the executive
with discretion to execute the laws as he saw fit.145

between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights
not surrendered to the prince.”); LOCKE, supra note 67, at 204 (“[T]hey have a very wrong notion of
government who say that the people have encroached upon the prerogative when they have got any part
of it to be defined by positive laws . . . .”); MATHER, supra note 104, at 456 (“As there are certain rights
of men, which are unalienable even by themselves; and others which they do not mean to alienate, when
they enter into civil society. And as power is naturally restless, aspiring and insatiable; it therefore
becomes necessary in all civil communities (either at their first formation or by degrees) that certain great
first principles be settled and established, determining and bounding the power and prerogative of the
ruler, ascertaining and securing the rights and liberties of the subjects, as the foundation stamina of the
government . . . .”); Resolutions of the Committee Chosen by the Several Counties in Pennsylvania, in
PRINCIPLES AND ACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 104, at 175, 175 (“‘The prerogatives
are limited,’ as a learned judge observes, ‘by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible to
exceed them, without the consent of the people on the one hand, or without, on the other, a violation of
that original contract, which, in all states impliedly, and in ours most expressly, subsists between the
prince and subject.”); VILE, supra note 66, at 72 (noting that the legislature ultimately has control of the
executive prerogative); James Wilson, Vindication of the Colonies (Jan. 1775), in 1 AMERICAN
ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF
AMERICA 68, 72 (Frank Moore ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (“The measures of [the king’s]
power, and the limits beyond which he cannot extend it, are circumscribed and regulated by [the British
constitution] . . . . Liberty is, by the [British] constitution, of equal stability, of equal antiquity, and of
equal authority with prerogative. . . . The law is the common standard, by which the excesses of
prerogative, as well as the excesses of liberty, are to be regulated and reformed. . . . [P]rerogative can
operate only when the law is silent.”).
144. This idea finds support in Thomas Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for Virginia:
The Executive—powers shall be exercised by a Governor . . . . By Executive powers
we mean no reference to those powers exercised under our former government by the
crown as of it’s prerogative; nor that these shall be the standard of what may or may
not be deemed the rightful powers of the Governor. We give him those powers only
which are necessary to carry into execution the laws, and which are not in their nature
[either legislative or] Judiciary.
Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 294, 299 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/0106-02-0255-0004 [https://perma.cc/DN5R-UFFD].
145. Contemporary dictionaries likewise support this distinction. Discretion was defined first as
“[p]rudence; knowledge to govern or direct one’s self; skill; wise management” and second as “[l]iberty
of acting at pleasure; uncontrolled and unconditional power . . . .” Discretion, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. Johnson et al., 8th ed., rev. 1799). Prerogative was
defined as “[a]n exclusive or peculiar privilege.” Prerogative, 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. Johnson et al., 8th ed., rev. 1799).
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III. The Original Public Meaning of Executive Power
In seeking to discern an original meaning of executive power, it
must not be discounted that the American colonists were, at their most
basic, British. And as such, they maintained their right to enjoy the
liberty and privileges enjoyed by those citizens residing in the mother
country.146 The liberty enjoyed by the British people could be found
“[i]n Laws made by the Consent of the People, and the due Execution
of those Laws; [the British citizen is] free not from the Law, but by the
Law.”147 Importantly, the king was not viewed as being above the law,
and because the legislature created the law, the legislature was the
supreme power.148
Colonial dissatisfaction with the long line of British monarchs who
misused the prerogatives, as well as the colonial perception of
Parliament as an oppressive and tyrannical force, led to grave concern
about the potential for abuse inherent in an unchecked allocation of
governmental power.149 As such, the colonists preserved the
146. An anonymous pamphlet entitled The Freeholder’s Political Catechism explains that a British
“Freeholder” is “govern’d by Laws, to which [he] give[s] [his] consent, and [his] Life, Liberty, and Goods,
cannot be taken from [him], but according to those Laws[.]” THE FREEHOLDER’S POLITICAL CATECHISM
3 (London, J. Roberts 1733).
147. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 5, 9 (“Q. Why is the Legislative Power Supreme? A. Because what gives Law to all, must be
Supreme. . . . Q. Is not then the King above the Laws? A. By no means . . . . he can have no Power but
what is given him by Law . . . .”). And as Lord Edward Coke, quoting Bracton, declared to King James I,
“quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege.” Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep.
1342 (K.B.) 1343; 12 Co. Rep. 64, 65. Lord Coke borrowed this phrase from the medieval legal scholar
Bracton; however, Coke omitted Bracton’s final words of the phrase: “quia lex facit regem.” Translated,
the phrase in its entirety reads, “The king ought to be under no man, but under God and the law, because
the law makes a king.” Rex non debit esse sub hoine, sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem, HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF LAW CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND PHRASES OF
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN 1043 (11th ed. 2004). Locke, likewise,
identified the legislative power as the supreme power. LOCKE, supra note 67, at 187, 188.
149. See LOCKE, supra note 67, at 187, 188; Madison Debates: June 25, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_625.asp [https://perma.cc/QWZ5-FW8J] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019) (“We must as has been observed suit our Governmt. to the people it is to direct.”); see
PROJECT,
also
Madison
Debates:
June
1,
AVALON
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_601.asp [https://perma.cc/7PFZ-YAKA] (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019); supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text. Madison noted,
Mr. [James] Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and
responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch
as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were
of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he
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fundamental definition of executive power that was imported from
Britain, with British history and colonial experience contributing to the
development of a distinctly American interpretation of the term.150
Accordingly, although the Framers declined to define executive power
in concrete terms,151 recurring in the colonial discussion of executive
power was the idea that the executive’s role should be confined to a
discrete function—namely, the power to execute the law.152
The text of the Constitution itself reveals the Framers’ efforts to
thwart the types of abuses committed by the British king and
Parliament. The colonists’ complaints against Parliament largely
related not to the scope of Parliamentary power but to how Parliament
used its power to infringe upon the colonists’ rights and liberties. On
the other hand, the grievances against the king were directly related to
the scope of the power he possessed, particularly his prerogatives.153
conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers,
not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.
Madison Debates: June 1, supra.
150. Frisch, supra note 62, at 281–82 (discussing the “originality of the American regime” as a blend
of traditional notions of monarchical power and republicanism); see also Madison Debates: June 25,
supra note 149 (Charles Pinckney noted, “[I]t is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation
of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose views ought to be extremely
different. Much has been said of the Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the
best Constitution in existence; but at the same time I am confident it is one that will not or can not be
introduced into this Country, for many centuries. -If it were proper to go here into a historical dissertation
on the British Constitution, it might easily be shewn that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature
of that Governmt. can not possibly be introduced into our System-that its balance between the Crown &
the people can not be made a part of our Constitution.”).
151. Richard M. Pious, Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics, 37 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 66, 68 (2007).
152. See Frisch, supra note 62, at 281 (“It is clear that at the time of the Constitutional Convention
virtually none of the delegates . . . were cognizant of a role for executive power in a republican
government beyond that of law enforcement and administration.”).
153. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 271. Professor Reinstein divides these prerogatives into five
categories: “(1) power over legislation and taxation; (2) power over the execution of laws; (3) control over
the legislature; (4) foreign affairs, military, and war powers; and (5) power over commerce.” Id. The
British monarch held a portion of the legislative power in that no bill could become law without the
sanction of the monarch. Id. at 277. The Framers maintained the executive veto power but subjected that
power to congressional override, greatly weakening the prerogative from that vested in the king. Id. at
278; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 143, at 546–47 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The qualified
negative of the President differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign . . . .”).
Another prerogative the Framers denied the President was the power to suspend or dispense with laws,
accomplished through the constitutional requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” Reinstein, supra note 108, at 280. The President was also deprived of the right to
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The necessity of a weakened executive was bolstered by seventeenthcentury Parliamentary failures to control the abuses of Charles I and
James II. As such, the prerogatives granted to the President were
significantly constrained in comparison to those held by the king—in
fact, the Constitution endowed the President exclusively with only one
of the royal prerogatives.154 The remaining royal prerogatives were
“vested completely in Congress, prohibited to the President, []
altogether omitted from the Constitution[, or] . . . more limited or
structurally shared with the legislative branch.”155 The legislature,
however, held powers markedly similar to those held by Parliament.
The legislative power, in traditional discourse, was the power to make
the law,156 and Congress retained that power. Perhaps most
importantly, no power held by Parliament was vested in the American
executive.157 Essentially, the Constitution is the culmination of the
Framers’ efforts to prevent a recurrence of those defects they perceived
in the British governmental form. Executive power should be
understood as nothing more than the power to execute the law;158 any
summon and dismiss the legislature, as well as the exclusive power of appointment of government
officials. Id. at 285, 288. The royal prerogatives to declare war, make treaties, and dispatch ambassadors
were divided between the President and the Senate by imposing the requirement of Senatorial approval.
Id. at 303; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 143, at 548 (“The President is to be commanderin-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the
same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and
admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the
raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature.”).
154. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 271. Namely, the power to receive foreign ambassadors and public
ministers. Id. at 305. By contrast, “[e]ighteen royal prerogatives were removed entirely from the Executive
and delegated to Congress.” Id. at 304.
155. Id. at 271.
156. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 143, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The essence of the
legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of
society . . . .”).
157. Reinstein, supra note 108, at 304. In an effort to prevent legislative tyranny, the Framers divided
the branch into two distinct bodies and provided for a check by the way of “interference” by the executive
and judicial branches. VILE, supra note 66, at 174–75. The executive holds veto power over the legislature
(although, to reiterate, the presidential veto is much weaker than the royal veto), and the judiciary holds
the power to invalidate laws. Id.
158. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 143, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he execution of the
laws, and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense,
seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate.”) (emphasis added).
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other power vested in the executive is synonymous with prerogative,
and the President’s ability to exercise that prerogative must remain
within the bounds set by the Constitution.159
The corpus linguistic data likewise support this inference. The
prevailing senses alone give credence to the argument that the
colonists’ understanding of executive power was inherently
intertwined with and defined by its British origins. As further evidence
of this proposition, among the most frequently used senses in Founding
Era texts were senses (4) and (5), pertaining to the executive power of
the Crown and to an executive body or council, such as the British
Parliament, respectively.160 It is therefore telling that the colonists
resorted to the same phrases used in the same ways as their British
predecessors when discussing the formation of a centralized
government of states. Moreover, semantically, the reference to a
singular executive power, as opposed to the divisible power of the
legislature used in Article I, harkens back to the notion of the executive
power vested in the Crown. Again, the drafters’ syntax and use of
language points to the executive’s deep roots in British political
underpinnings, suggesting that the Framers were deeply invested in not
only preserving but also perfecting the British governmental structure
that they knew.
Finally, although we have spent considerable time on the isolated
phrase executive power, that phrase must be considered in context.
Indeed, the Framers understood that the Constitution would be
interpreted according to the “usual and established” rules of statutory
interpretation, which as discussed briefly in Part I, include the noscitur
a sociis rule—that is, that Article II must be construed in the context
of the surrounding text.161 Thus, the meaning of “executive power”
159. See generally id.
160. See app. 2.
161. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish
a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791) in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 111 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0060-0003
[https://perma.cc/UN6HGZK4] (“[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that
intention is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the usual & established rules of
construction.”) (emphasis added); BRUTUS, ESSAY NO. 11 (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
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must be considered in light of the Constitution’s preamble,162 which
makes clear that the Constitution was ratified in furtherance of six
expansive purposes: “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity.”163 Although these purposes are most often reduced
to rhetoric, they should be consulted when attempting to define the
terms of the Constitution.
A syntactic analysis of the first purpose, “to form a more perfect
Union,” indicates that the Framers sought to draft a constitution
providing for a government superior to another. Although, at first
glance, this appears to be a reference to the failed union created
pursuant to the Articles of Confederation, historical context shows that
at several points in its history, Britain was referred to as a “perfect
Union.”164 Marrying the plain grammatical reading with the historical
context, the phrase then takes on new meaning: to create a form of
government superior to that of Britain. Indeed, the Revolution was
FEDERALIST
417,
421
(Herbert
J.
Storing
ed.,
1981),
http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s31.html [https://perma.cc/JW2Q-B4PX] (“[I]n construing
any of the articles conveying power, the spirit, intent and design of the clause, should be attended to, as
well as the words in their common acceptation.”).
162. BRUTUS, ESSAY NO. 12 (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 161,
at
422,
424,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a3_2_1s20.html
[https://perma.cc/XPR6-F6AD] (“[The courts] will be authorized to give the constitution a construction
according to its spirit and reason, and not to confine themselves to its letter. To discover the spirt of the
constitution, it is of the first importance to attend to the principal ends and designs it has in view. These
are expressed in the preamble . . . .”).
163. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
164. Id. This phrase was used during the reigns of multiple monarchs, including James I, James II, and
Anne. COBBETT, supra note 119, at 356, app. 1 at cxxix. Queen Anne used the phrase herself during a
speech to Parliament: “An entire and perfect Union [of England and Scotland] will be the solid foundation
of lasting peace: it will secure your religion, liberty and property, remove the animosities among
yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our own two kingdoms . . . .” Id. app. 1 at cxxix,
356; see also id. at 356 (“The kindness and indulgence your majesty [Queen Anne] hath expressed for all
your subjects: your care to create a perfect union among us by forewarning us of the mischiefs of
divisions . . . .”); 8 T. SMOLLETT, A COMPLETE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 224 (London, James Rivington &
James Fletcher 1758) (“[King James II] replied, That he did not expect such a remonstrance from the
commons, after he had demonstrated the advantages that would arise from a perfect union between him
and his parliament . . . .”); James I, Speech to Parliament Concerning Union with Scotland (1607), in
CROWN AND PARLIAMENT IN TUDOR-STUART ENGLAND 164, 164 (Paul L. Hughes & Robert F. Fries eds.,
1959) (“I desire a perfect union of laws and persons, and such a naturalizing as may make one body of
both kingdoms under me [James I] your King . . . .”).
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understood “as the final, violent phase of a sustained effort to vindicate
the true meaning of the ancient English constitution.”165 In Federalist
No. 5, John Jay quotes Queen Anne, explaining that Britain’s history
“gives us many useful lessons. We may profit by their experience
without paying the price it cost them.”166 And the Framers sought to
do just that—learn from the failures of the British form of government
and establish a reformed government that would secure the life, liberty,
and property of the new American citizens.
IV. Executive Power: The Supreme Court vs. The Court of Public
Opinion
Despite the compelling historical backdrop and relatively fixed
understanding, if not explicit definition, of executive power in
Founding Era American discourse, the courts of both law and of public
opinion have interpreted Article II in ways that justify a wide variety
of presidential (mis)conduct—much of which is only dubiously
consistent with early understandings of the phrase.167 In fact, empirical
data collected in the late 1980s shows that the Supreme Court voted to
uphold presidential action 66.3% of the time during the postwar era
spanning from 1949 to 1984, and federal appellate courts upheld
challenged presidential action in 73.4% of instances. 168 Thus, in
contrast to the Founding Era public understanding of the executive’s
limited role as a check on legislative power, the last half-century has
been characterized by a judicial tendency to ratify a broad variety of

165. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 888
(1985).
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, supra note 143, at 18 (John Jay).
167. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–65 (2013)
(noting that the executive has claimed and will continue to claim “extraordinary authority . . . reading the
supposed ambiguities of Article II as an invitation to act”).
168. Craig R. Ducat & Robert L. Dudley, Federal Judges and Presidential Power: Truman to Reagan,
22 AKRON L. REV. 561, 565 (1989). Interestingly, the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University
School of Law reports that, during the Trump presidency, federal courts have upheld challenged executive
action in only four of the fifty-nine cases surveyed. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts,
POL’Y
INTEGRITY,
https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup
N.Y.U.
INST.
[https://perma.cc/ZB3H-YG9P] (last visited Dec. 12, 2019).
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presidential actions.169 To that end, the following presents a brief
survey of two flagship Supreme Court cases—one upholding the
exercise of executive power and one restricting it—and a discussion of
the public response to those judgments.
A. Expanding Executive Power Beyond Mere Execution: Myers v.
United States
In 1920, President Woodrow Wilson removed Portland postmaster
Frank Myers from office, igniting litigation that eventually made its
way to our country’s highest court.170 Following his dismissal, Myers
filed suit in the United States Court of Claims, contending that Wilson
had no authority to remove Myers or any other postmaster from office
without the consent of the Senate.171 Chief Justice William Taft,
writing for the majority, addressed the question of “whether under the
Constitution the President has the exclusive power of removing
executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”172
In an opinion spanning more than seventy pages, the Chief Justice
relied heavily on the debates surrounding what he referred to as “the
decision of 1789” to support his conclusion that the President, in fact,
possesses an exclusive power of removal.173 Focusing on statements

169. N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, supra note 168. It is also worth noting that judges of both political
affiliations overwhelmingly supported presidential action in cases concerning the President’s apparent
infringement on the legislative power. Ducat & Dudley, supra note 168, at 567 (noting 83.3% of
Democratic judges and 88% of Republican judges voted to uphold the presidential action at issue).
170. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
171. Id.
172. Id. The statute at issue read as follows: “Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be
appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.” Id. at 107.
173. This decision concerned the establishment of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the ensuing
debates centered on the question of whether the Secretary of the Department should be removable by the
President. Id. at 111. Taft seems to base his reliance on these debates largely upon the fact that eighteen
legislators—eight Representatives and ten Senators—were present at the Constitutional Convention. Id.
at 114, 285. Taft noted that six of the eight Representatives and six of the ten Senators voted to imbue the
President with the removal power. Myers, 272 U.S. at 114–15. Taft glossed over the fact that the bill
passed the House by a vote of 29-22 and only passed the Senate after Vice President John Adams cast the
deciding vote, breaking a 10-10 tie. Id.
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made by James Madison, Taft established three theories upon which
his holding rested:
(1) “[A]rticle [II] by vesting the executive power in the
President was intended to grant to him the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers except as
thereafter expressly provided in that [A]rticle”;174
(2) “[T]he express recognition of the power of appointment
in the second section [of Article II] enforced this view on
the well-approved principle of constitutional and
statutory construction that the power of removal of
executive officers was incident to the power of
appointment”;175 and
(3) It would be unreasonable to assume that the Framers,
without express provision, intended to give any part of
the legislative branch the ability to direct the executive
and, in doing so, potentially hamper the executive’s
discharging his duties by saddling him with inefficient or
disloyal subordinates or subordinates who maintained
different political views than his own.176
Taft noted that, consistent with the Founding Era understanding of the
phrase, the “vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws.”177 But he chose
not to stop there, opining “that the natural meaning of the term
‘executive power’ granted the President included the appointment and
removal of executive subordinates.”178 In support of this assertion, he
looked no further than his Court’s earlier decisions, explaining that his
broader view of executive power comported with the phrase’s “natural
meaning” because appointments and removals “certainly were not the
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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exercise of legislative or judicial power in government as usually
understood.”179 Ultimately, Taft’s opinion stands for the proposition
that any attempts by Congress to limit the presidential power to remove
executive officers appointed by the President are unconstitutional. Taft
returned to the President one of the prerogatives the Framers chose to
deny him: the power of removal.180
Three justices—McReynolds, Brandeis, and Holmes—dissented
from the majority opinion. Justice McReynolds approached the issue
in a manner remarkably similar to that of Taft, going so far as to use
many of the same sources as Taft, albeit to reach a different
conclusion. McReynolds conceded that removal could be an executive
act, if Congress so decreed, but posited that Congress retained the
power to direct how that removal could be accomplished.181 Justice
Brandeis took a different tack, choosing to address a significantly
narrower question than that addressed by Taft.182 He focused on the
separation of powers and emphasized that the Convention of 1787
adopted the doctrine “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but
by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy.”183 Justice Holmes’s dissent was significantly briefer
than those of his fellow dissenters, succinctly emphasizing his belief
that “[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a

179. Id. at 117–18.
180. See Reinstein, supra note 108, at 294. Professor Reinstein finds significant the exclusion of an
expressly enumerated removal power considering how important the removal power was to the British
monarch. Id. He views the removal power as an implied power subject to congressional restriction. Id. at
322 n.347. Such an interpretation comports with the idea that the legislative power includes the power to
direct the executive as to how it should execute the law.
181. Myers, 272 U.S. at 231 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“If it be admitted that the Constitution by
direct grant vests the President with all executive power, it does not follow that he can proceed in defiance
of congressional action. Congress, by clear language, is empowered to make all laws necessary and proper
for carrying into execution powers vested in him.”).
182. Id. at 241 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“May the President, having acted under the statute in so far as
it creates the office and authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the Senate is in session, the provision
which prescribes the condition under which a removal may take place? It is this narrow question, and this
only, which we are required to decide.”).
183. Id.
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duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more
than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”184
The public immediately recognized and, in most cases, condemned
the Court’s expansion of the executive power.185 The overarching
public opinion seemed to be that the Myers decision effectively
transformed the President of our democratic nation into a despot or at
least provided him with the authority to behave as a despot. Senator
Hiram W. Johnson of California remarked that “[t]here will be those
who exclaim what this country needs is another Mussolini and who
rejoice in any extension of executive power, and others who declare
that the very liberty of the people is involved in the stability of official
tenure.”186 The headlines in a Nebraska newspaper declared “Can
Remove as He Wills,” “New Power to President Granted by Supreme
Court,” and “Congress Shorn of Rights,” indicating that the public
recognized the gravity of the decision.187 Still other articles expressed
increasingly alarmist views: “[U]nder the supreme court’s latest
interpretation, the chief executive can lop off heads right out in public
without asking anybody’s permission.”188 In an effort to emphasize the
significance of the Myers decision, one article listed all those
government officials the President could now dismiss with
capriciousness, specifically the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Comptroller General, and the
Postmaster General, among others.189 Nevertheless, some support was
184. Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
185. The magnitude of this decision was even recognized by our neighbors to the north. See, e.g., The
President’s Powers, WINNIPEG TRIB., Nov. 11, 1926, at 4 (“Something akin to dismay swept through oldfashioned ‘liberty loving’ Americans last week when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that it was within
the power of the President to remove postmasters and other statutory officials without waiting for the
Senate’s concurrence.”).
186. Ruth Finney, Johnson Says President’s Removal Power is Menace, PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 6,
1926, at 13.
187. Can Remove as He Wills, NEB. ST. J., Oct. 26, 1926, at 1; see also Presidential Firing Power,
OXNARD PRESS-COURIER, Nov. 13, 1926, at 2 (“The decision does give a President dangerous power over
federal commissions and boards created by Congress and, in theory, at least, working
independently. . . . There are numerous bodies of this type whose usefulness is greatly lessened if their
members hold their jobs only by grace of the President who appointed them. They will tend to lose their
individuality and independence and merely reflect the views of the Executive.”).
188. Senate Will Fight for Power to Fire, IRONWOOD DAILY GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1926, at 6.
189. Eliot Harris, Supreme Court Makes President an Autocrat, LINCOLN HERALD, Nov. 12, 1926, at
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expressed for the Myers opinion, most of which downplayed the
alarmism exhibited by the opinion’s critics while celebrating the
elevation of the executive.190
Corpus linguistic tools once again provide useful evidence in
support of these public sentiments. A search in the Corpus of
Historical American English (COHA) yielding the collocates of
executive power during the 1910s and 1920s shows that the following
words were among those that most frequently co-occurred with the
phrase executive power: limit, uncontrollable, stretch, and violent.191
Additionally, a COHA collocate search for words appearing one word
to the left of executive during this time period produced interesting
results—whereas the same search in the COFEA performed in Part I
of this paper yielded no collocates with private sector connotations,192
the COHA search shows that in the early 1900s, private sector
associations were beginning to creep into the list of executive’s
collocates.193 For example, industrial occurred fifth most frequently
1. The article went on to explain the extent of the President’s newly expanded power of removal:
By his control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the president is made absolute
master of the railroads, so far as these come under the government control at all. By his
control of the Federal Reserve Board, he becomes dictator of our national banking
system. He is czar of the administration of justice in Alaska and the District of
Columbia by virtue of his power to dismiss the judges of these regions . . . No
constitutional monarch in the world has anything remotely approaching such power. If
the king of England tried to exercise any one of these powers without the consent of
parliament, he would be ousted from his palace and his throne as soon as the English
people could realize what he was doing.
Id.
190. A West Virginia newspaper’s editorial board compiled views of the Myers opinion collected from
newspapers across the country. The Columbus Ohio State Journal expressed contempt for critics of the
Myers opinion, writing, “The view of the liberals . . . probably is that the decision places a dangerous
power in the president’s hands, capable of being abused greatly. The danger exists theoretically but is
almost negligible practically. A president, sobered by his great office, is not likely to be a mere political
self-seeker.” Emphatic Disagreement over Ruling on President’s Powers, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 4, 1926, at 6. The Richmond News-Leader wrote that “for better or for worse, America is committed
to executive, not to congressional administration, and American must make real the power of the man to
whom she entrusts her affairs.” Id.
191. Corpus of Historical American English, ENGLISH-CORPORA.ORG, https://www.englishcorpora.org/coha/ [https://perma.cc/8Q4P-XNYY] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter COHA]
(collocate search of executive power in 1910 and 1920 looking at results within four words to the left of
the phrase).
192. See discussion supra Part I.
193. COHA, supra note 191 (collocate search of executive in 1910 and 1920 limited to words occurring
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after chief, central, national, and democratic.194 While the public
understanding of the executive’s role remained solidly rooted in a
governmental context and, in fact, appears to have closely aligned with
the original Founding Era understanding of executive power, evidence
of the preliminary stages of linguistic drift toward the private-sector
connotation of executive is also apparent and possibly influenced the
evolution of public perception of the executive’s role.
B. Agreeing to Disagree: A Fragmented Supreme Court’s
Rejection of Executive Overreach in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v.
Sawyer
Although President Harry Truman became the thirty-third President
merely by default upon the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, he
took comfortably to the position and frequently tested the bounds of
executive power during his tenure.195 After ordering American troops
into Korea in 1950 without specific Congressional authorization, an
act by itself of questionable constitutionality,196 Truman pressed the
limits of his executive authority even further by issuing Executive
Order 10340.197 In an attempt to thwart a potential nationwide
steelworker strike, Truman’s executive order directed the Secretary of
Commerce to seize privately owned steel mills.198 Again acting
without Congressional approval, the President justified his bold move
as necessary to address the imminent national defense crisis that would
result should steel production halt during wartime.199 The steel
companies complied under protest but challenged the constitutionality
of the President’s actions almost immediately, arguing that the “order
amount[ed] to lawmaking, a legislative function which the

within one word to the left of executive).
194. Id.
195. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 21,
32 (1995).
196. See generally id.
197. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).
198. Id.
199. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 97, Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (No. 745).
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Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the
President.”200
Although a six-to-three majority declared Truman’s actions
unconstitutional, the Court remained highly fragmented as to the
reasons why, resulting in the issuance of seven distinct opinions.201
Justice Hugo Black, a renowned constitutional originalist,202 spoke for
the majority in a brief opinion defined by a faithful adherence to the
doctrine of separation of powers.203 In language reminiscent of the
Founding Era, he noted, “In the framework of our Constitution, the
President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”204 Thus, he rejected the
government’s argument that Article II vests in the President “all the
executive powers of which the Government is capable.”205 Instead, he
held that the seizure of the steel mills was an unconstitutional
infringement by the President on the legislative powers of Congress.206
Accordingly, Justice Black’s oft-overlooked majority opinion was

200. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582–83.
201. Id. at 580; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 353 (5th ed.
2015).
202. HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968) (“I strongly believe that this history shows
that the basic purpose and plan of the Constitution is that the federal government should have no powers
except those that are expressly or impliedly granted, and that no department of government—executive,
legislative, or judicial—has authority to add to or take from the powers granted it or the powers denied it
by the Constitution . . . judges may [not] rewrite our basic charter of government under the guise of
interpreting it.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black
and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 24, 31 (1994) (noting that Justice Black believed that “there is a single,
immutable, judicially discoverable meaning for each part of the Constitution” and asserted that “in the
construction of the language of the Constitution . . . we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the
condition of the men who framed that instrument”) (quoting BLACK, supra).
203. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582–89.
204. Id. at 587.
205. Id. at 640 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 96). Bizarrely, the government, at one
point in its brief, appeared to justify the expansive use of presidential power in the steel seizure case with
the fact that Truman ordered troops into Korea, claiming that act was a lawful “exercise of the President’s
constitutional powers.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 98. However, history has shown that
Truman’s unilateral commitment of troops to the Korean conflict without congressional consent was far
from constitutionally black and white. See generally Fisher, supra note 195.
206. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587 (“This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military
authorities. . . . The Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”).
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arguably extremely faithful to the original public meaning of executive
power.
Despite the fact that Justice Black wrote for the majority, courts and
scholars have favored Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in
Steel Seizure, which, while reaching the same conclusion, took a
markedly different approach to interpreting executive power. Justice
Jackson posited that “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress.”207 He proceeded to lay out his seminal three-part
framework of “practical situations in which a President may doubt, or
others may challenge, his powers,” which he defined as: (1) when the
President acts with Congressional authorization, whether it be express
or implied; (2) when the President acts without Congressional
authorization, but relying on his own independent powers; and
(3) when the President acts contrary to the express or implied will of
Congress.208 Jackson argued that the magnitude of presidential power
is determined by which of the three categories defines his actions, with
the first category affording the most power to the President and the
third, the least.209 Without addressing the consistency of this
framework with the original public meaning of executive power,210
unquestionably Jackson’s canonized framework has been relied upon
by courts and scholars alike to justify a sweeping variety of executive
actions, many of which were and remain unfathomable under a
Founding Era understanding of executive power.211
207. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 635–38.
209. Id. at 636–37.
210. While we seriously question whether a President acting pursuant to Jackson’s third category would
ever be within the bounds of the original meaning of executive power, answering this question is simply
beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, our discussion of Steel Seizure is offered for the purpose of
illustrating the lasting effects of judicial interpretation on public perception of executive power and the
ways in which judicial decisions are used to affirmatively shape the power of the President.
211. See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that the President
has the exclusive power to formally recognize a foreign sovereign, even though doing so falls within
Jackson’s third category and the action is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress”);
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (holding in part that Congress has the right to delegate to
the President the authority to prescribe aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty by a courtmartial upon a member of the Armed Forces who has been convicted of murder); Dames & Moore v.
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In addition to the legal nuts and bolts, the facts of Steel Seizure were
highly publicized in American newspapers and elicited a strong
reaction from the 1950s public.212 Truman was likened to a king,
attempting to usurp the executive power through his assertion of a
“divine right.”213 He was referred to as “the wrong sort of president”
attempting to “drag us into dictatorship.”214 A Chicago women’s group
characterized the seizure of the steel manufacturing plants as the
“latest of a long line of executive usurpation of power through
executive orders and in derogation and usurpation of the constitutional
powers vested in the Congress of the United States—all of which acts
are illegal . . . and rest on claims to unlimited and unrestrained
executive power” and called for a new presidential candidate.215 A
New York paper forcefully asserted that “[the district court’s] decision
[finding Truman’s actions unconstitutional] sets off a nationwide steel
strike, but it is far better that the nation bear the catastrophe of such a
strike than that a precedent be suffered in departure from constitutional
government.”216 Although some were willing to look past the

Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (relying on Jackson’s framework to justify the President’s authority to freeze
Iranian assets in the United States).
212. See, e.g., Pat Hillings, Hillings Explains Stand on Steel Plant Seizure, COVINA ARGUS-CITIZEN,
May 2, 1952, at 8 (“I have never seen the people at home as interested in government and politics as they
are today. Everywhere I went throughout the district, Democrats and Republicans alike expressed deep
concern and disgust over the corruption and lack of morality in the government. The people at home seem
to be aware of the fact that only a change in our national leadership can eliminate corruption and restore
confidence in the executive branch.”); Text of O’Connor’s Speech to Senate on Steel Seizure, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 23, 1952, at 7 (“The seizure of the steel plants is the very kind of situation that t[h]e founding fathers
foresaw as leading to the concentration of too much power in one branch of the government.”); Think
Straight, Legalists, MARION STAR, Apr. 19, 1952, at 6 (calling precedent permitting the President’s
seizure of the steel mills “shortsighted”).
213. James W. Fifield, Jr., Steel Seizure Akin to the Theory of Divine Right of Kings, Says Minister,
DAILY TIMES (Davenport, Iowa), Apr. 28, 1952, at 14 (“I am terrified at the thought of an America so
apathetic, so unconcerned, so demoralized that it will sit passively by as the dagger of unlimited executive
power is pressed toward the very heart of American freedom.”).
214. Show-Down Time, ITHACA J., Apr. 26, 1952, at 6.
215. Steel Seizure Is Scored by Club Women, CHI. STAR, June 3, 1952, at 5.
216. Historic Decision Outlawing Steel Seizure Moves for Return to Government Under Law, PRESS &
SUN-BULL. (Binghamton, N.Y.), Apr. 30, 1952, at 6 (referring to the government’s argument that the
President is vested with “inherent powers” as a “shadowy theory” and positing that a “[p]resent definition
of the limitations of executive power is wholesome and salutary in a period . . . in which the executive
branch would tend to stretch its prerogatives and tend to deem too lightly the philosophy of checks and
balances implicit in the Constitution”).
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constitutional implications and focus on the politics at play—
presidential defense of downtrodden steel workers against the greedy
interests of “big steel” robber barons217—the public appears to have
overwhelmingly disapproved of President Truman’s actions as
executive overreach.
Again, as was the case in Myers, the rhetoric surrounding Steel
Seizure is thematically similar to that present in the Constitutional
Convention debates and in the wider public discourse of the Founding
Era: a rejection of a monarch;218 a preference for limited executive
functions as opposed to broad, inherent executive power;219 and a
deferential view of the legislature as the exclusive maker of laws.220
Moreover, a corpus-based search of the phrase executive power shows
that, during the 1940s and 1950s, executive power most frequently
co-occurred with jealousy, limits, broad, and fear, among others.221
Searching COHA for adjectives within three words preceding
presidency during the same time period likewise produces unfit,
powerful, Jacksonian, and big.222 This data suggests that, in the public
discourse of 1940s and 1950s America, the President was criticized for
his attempted expansion of executive power and that the American
people wanted to retain the more narrow meaning of the Founding Era,
consistent with Justice Black’s majority opinion. However, just as in

217. Holmes Alexander, Maybe Truman Planned the Steel Seizure as Campaign Ammunition, L.A.
TIMES, May 9, 1952, at 39 (explaining that, before issuing Executive Order 10340, Truman ordered a
nation-wide sampling of public opinion regarding seizure of the steel mills, the results of which showed
“no sympathy for the steel owners,” “no misgivings about the power of seizure,” “little if any feeling that
the snatching of somebody else’s property was a violation of the Constitution,” and “no tremor to indicate
fear of dictatorship”).
218. Madison Debates: June 1, supra note 149.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. COHA, supra note 191 (collocate search of “executive power” in 1940 and 1950). The third most
common collocate associated with executive power during this time period was McCarthy, demonstrating
how fickly associated the notion of executive power is with political movements. Id. Further review of
the concordance line results shows that even where broad is associated with executive power, it is in the
context of Congress’s authorizing a temporary broad grant of executive power to the President or judicial
disapproval of an attempt to assert broad executive power. Id. Therefore, the corpus linguistic data
supports the conclusion that broad executive power was viewed with disfavor during this time period.
222. Id. (collocate search of presidency during the 1940s and 1950s limited to adjectives occurring
within three words to the left).
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the 1910s and 1920s, a collocate search of the term executive in the
1940s and 1950s shows an increased frequency of private sector
collocates—even more than in the Myers era—suggesting that
executive continued to take on new connotations throughout the
twentieth century.223
C. Executive Action in the Modern Era: Half a Century of
Presidential Overreach
While the political discretion of the judiciary has undoubtedly
shaped the legal definition of executive power, the corpus linguistic
data and the social response to those judicial opinions suggest that the
public meaning of executive power has nevertheless remained
relatively fixed. The common thread in public discourse from the
Founding Era to the 1920s through the 1950s is a rejection of perceived
presidential overreach, evincing a public understanding of a narrow
executive power limited to little more than the mere execution of the
laws. Indeed, a series of presidential attempts to usurp more power
than is allocated to the position led one commentator to refer to the
presidency as a “juggernaut that crippled the proper functioning of []
government.”224
The above reference was particularly aimed at the actions taken by
disgraced President Richard Nixon in connection with the infamous
Watergate scandal. Among the allegations levied against Nixon at his
impeachment hearings were that he “used the executive power to
authorize illegal surveillance and investigations by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation,” “used the executive power to unlawfully establish a
special investigative unit inside the White House to engage in unlawful
covert activities,” “used the executive power to obtain confidential tax
return information from the Internal Revenue Service,” and “used the
executive power to impede lawful inquiries into the conduct of his
223. Id. (collocate search of words occurring within one word to the left of executive during the 1940s
and 1950s).
224. Herbert H. Bennett & Theodore Koskoff, Foreword to ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
CONFERENCE, THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY: FINAL REPORT 5 (1975) [hereinafter POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENCY].
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office.”225 In other words, the draft impeachment articles read as a
laundry list of actions effected by the President’s exercise of executive
power not at all related to the President’s executive function—that is,
the execution of the laws.
Even apart from the abuses of executive power stemming from the
Watergate scandal, Nixon was criticized for attempting to expand the
scope of the executive in various other aspects of his presidency.226
For instance, in 1971, prior to Watergate, the Chicago Tribune referred
to Nixon as an “arrogant usurper of ‘raw executive power’ not
delegated to him under the Constitution.”227 Democratic Senator Sam
Ervin, ultimately an instrumental figure in the Watergate scandal,
reportedly contended that Nixon had amassed “the most dangerous
concentration of executive power in our history.”228 Much criticism
centered around Nixon’s liberal use of the executive order, an
ever-more familiar theme in twenty-first century American political
discourse. Moreover, Watergate, the ensuing investigations, and
Nixon’s ultimate resignation clearly exacerbated public distrust of a
powerful executive. The office of the President was referred to as “the
imperial presidency,”229 a “runaway presidency,”230 and an “iniquitous
presidency.”231 One newspaper comically asserted that Nixon’s
presidency made “the Cult of the Strong Presidency about as popular
as snake handling in church” and that former “true believers” in the
strong executive movement were losing faith as a result of his
actions.232 Thus, history suggests that, even when a strong executive

225. Draft Impeachment Articles, reprinted in Compromise Impeachment Articles to be Debated,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 25, 1974, at 4.
226. See, e.g., Executive Abuses, PALM BEACH POST, Oct. 25, 1971, at 14 (“The Nixon administration
has disturbed the triangle of power in a number of alarming ways.”).
227. Willard Edwards, Nixon Rapped on ‘Raw Power’ Play, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 1971, at 12.
228. Gaylord Shaw, Nixon Using Executive Power in Efforts to Reshape Government, LAWTON
CONST., Mar. 15, 1973, at 18 (referring to the President’s policies, not the allegations of Watergate).
229. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Rise in Gall of the American Emperor, BALT. SUN, Dec. 23, 1973,
at 35; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 224.
230. Arnold B. Sawislak, Congress Has Only Self to Blame for Runaway Presidency Powers,
SIMPSON’S LEADER-TIMES (Kittanning, Pa.), Jan. 24, 1974, at 6; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY,
supra note 224.
231. Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Weakness of the Presidency, DAILY WORLD (Opelousas, La.),
Feb. 28, 1975, at 4; see also POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY, supra note 224.
232. Sawislak, supra note 230.

Published by Reading Room,

51

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [], Art. 9

658

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:Spec. Issue

movement gains temporary momentum, as it did during President John
F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign, an overly strong executive in practice is
inconsistent with the American view of the President’s constitutionally
vested executive power, a view that has remained relatively fixed since
the Founding Era.
CONCLUSION
“[T]he experience of man sheds a good deal of light . . . not merely
on the need for effective power, if society is to be at once cohesive and
civilized, but also on the need for limitations on the power of governors
over the governed.”233 It is no surprise then that concerns about
executive power have plagued public discourse well into the
twenty-first century with no apparent end in sight. Presidents Obama
and Trump are not the only Presidents to be accused of pressing the
boundaries, and even exceeding the scope, of the executive power.
Indeed, every President since Nixon has been assailed with accusations
of executive overreach.234 No doubt, the controversy over the
233. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
234. Bruce Bartlett, The Ebb and Flow of Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Feb. 18, 2014,
12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/the-ebb-and-flow-of-executive-power
[https://perma.cc/7CVZ-ATZV] (“The modern history of congressional concern about executive
overreach begins with Richard Nixon.”); Richard M. Salsman, When It Comes to Abuse of Presidential
Power,
Obama
is
a
Mere
Piker,
FORBES
(Jan.
28,
2013,
8:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardsalsman/2013/01/28/when-it-comes-to-abuse-of-presidentialpower-obama-is-a-mere-piker/#12d3e236235e [https://perma.cc/U2BQ-6JQV]. See, e.g., Breach of
Faith, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Nov. 18, 1978, at 2 (characterizing the Carter administration’s closure of
millions of acres in Alaska to commercial development as “the most arbitrary and capricious use of
executive power [] ever encountered”); James Cary, Pardon Raises Question of Power, FREMONT TRIB.,
Oct. 3, 1974, at 4 (discussing the public “furor” raised by Ford’s issuance of a “full, free, and absolute
pardon” to Nixon); Alexander Cockburn, Impeachment: Always a Good Idea, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998,
at 29 (“Clinton’s arrogance rivals that of Richard Nixon’s during the Watergate crisis.”); Michael Kinsley,
President Should Let Congress Make War, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 12 (discussing expansion
of executive power under President George H.W. Bush); Anthony Lewis, A Drastic Assertion of Executive
Power, SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Mar. 31, 1983, at 40 (calling on the Supreme Court to reject ”[a broad]
assertion of executive power” under Reagan); Thomas B. Edsall, Trump’s Tool Kit Does Not Include the
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/opinion/trumpdemocracy-midterm-elections.html [https://perma.cc/JCU4-HAJ7] (“Trump won the Republican
nomination and the presidency by conducting a campaign directly challenging the notion that the
electorate will punish a politician for ‘violating accepted constitutional arrangements.’ He has not wavered
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Executive’s proper role will continue to plague scholars and politicians
well into the future. However, if the Constitution is akin to a contract
between the American people and their government, then the original
meaning of “executive power” is instrumental in understanding its
terms. And though the desires of the Founding Fathers are
unknowable, like any contract, the literal words on the page and the
context in which they were written are strong evidence of exactly what
the American people bargained for in 1787. Moreover, with the help
of corpus linguistics and modern technology, we now have the tools to
study more empirically the original meaning of a constitutional phrase
as understood at its inception.
Finally, we do not expect that an original public meaning analysis
of executive power will close the debate surrounding the proper
exercise of executive authority in the United States. Nevertheless, it
should be considered as an interpretive ground zero—informing the
debate from the perspective of those who entered into this “more
perfect union” over two hundred years ago.

from this course throughout the first year of his presidency, and, barring unforeseen events, it will guide
him into the 2020 election. If Republicans retain control of both branches of Congress in 2018 . . . Trump
will claim vindication. His assault on the pillars of democracy will continue unabated, with increasingly
insidious effect.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Tyranny in the Name of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/12/opinion/tyranny-in-the-name-of-freedom.html
[https://perma.cc/W96L-PBG7] (characterizing “the use of the Secret Service to silence [protestors at the
Republican National Convention] as an abuse of the executive power”); Michael D. Shear, Obama’s Effort
to Go It Alone on Guns Brings Republicans Together, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016, 7:30 AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/01/05/obamas-effort-to-go-it-alone-on-guns-bringsrepublicans-together [https://perma.cc/J5HK-PM6J] (noting the opinions of prominent Republicans as to
President Obama’s decision to “take unilateral action on gun control in the face of congressional
gridlock”).
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APPENDIX 1: RAW SENSE FREQUENCY CODING
1. As belonging to a Single Governmental Leader (non-royal)
(e.g., President, governor)
2. As belonging to the head of a private company
3. As referring to one’s autonomy over oneself (akin to will
power)
4. As belonging to a body of Governmental leaders (e.g.,
council)
5. As belonging to the Crown/Divine power
6. As a division of finite governmental power relating to the
allocation of responsibilities between governmental branches
Year
Register
Sense Freq.
1754
Franklin Papers
4
1
1754
Franklin Papers
1
1
1755
Franklin Papers
1
1
1760
Franklin Papers
4
2
1760
Franklin Papers
1
1
1761
Election Sermon
5
1
1761
Election Sermon
4
1
1762
Political/Legal
4
11
1764
Political/Legal
1
1
1764
book
4
1
1766
Political/Legal
5
1
1766
Election Sermon
1
2
1767
Religious Sermon
3
1
1767
Election Sermon
5
1
1767
Religious Sermon
1
1
1768
Election Sermon
1
3
1768
Personal Letter
1
1
1768
political speech by non-political
1
1
1769
Political/Legal
1
4
1769
Personal Letter from Gov.
1
1
1769
Political/Legal
4
1
1769
religious text
5
1
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1770
1770
1772
1772
1772
1773
1773
1773
1773
1773
1774
1774
1774
1774
1774
1774
1775
1775
1775
1775
1775
1775
1775
1775
1775
1776
1776
1776
1776
1776
1776
1776
1776
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Adams Papers
Franklin Papers
Religious Sermon
Newspaper
Adams Papers
John Locke
John Locke
John Locke
Political/Legal
religious text
Election Sermon
pamphlet
pamphlet
Jefferson Papers
religious text
political/legal
Adams Papers
Hamilton Papers
Edmund Burke (speech)
Political/Legal
Election Sermon
Franklin Papers
Newspaper
Newspaper
Religious Sermon
Adams Papers
Adams Papers
Newspaper
Jefferson Papers
pamphlet
Jefferson Papers
political/legal
political/legal

661

5
5
3
5
5
5
3
1
5
5
4
5
1
1
5
5
1
5
4
5
4
5
1
5
1
1
4
5
1
5
1
5
4

1
3
1
1
1
9
7
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
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1777
1778
1778
1779
1779
1780
1780
1780
1780
1780
1781
1781
1782
1782
1782
1782
1783
1784
1784
1785
1785
1785
1785
1786
1787
1787
1787
1787
1787
1787
1787
1788
1788
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political/legal
Religious Sermon
political/legal
political/legal
political/legal
Religious Sermon
Election Sermon
Adams Papers
Political/Legal
Jefferson Papers
Political/Legal
religious text
Election Sermon
political/legal
political/legal
book
political/legal
political/legal
political/legal
personal letter
pamphlet
book
political/legal
Political/Legal
pamphlet
court case
Hamilton papers
political/legal
Adams Papers
Adams Papers
book
pamphlet
pamphlet

1
5
1
3
1
1
4
4
1
1
1
5
5
4
1
1
1
1
5
6
6
3
1
1
4
6
1
6
6
1
3
1
5

5
1
8
1
9
1
1
2
1
1
12
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
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1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1788
1789
1789
1789
1789
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pamphlet
Adams diary
Hamilton Papers
Monroe Papers
Monroe Papers
Monroe Papers
Adams Papers (Letter)
geographic report
geographic report
Political/Legal
Adams Papers
Adams Papers
Jefferson Papers
Hamilton Papers

663

6
1
1
6
1
5
5
4
1
6
5
6
5
1

APPENDIX 2: SENSE FREQUENCY PER MILLION
FREQUENCY PER MILLION
Period Total Words
1
2
3
4
5
1754– 211,416.49
4.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1759
1760– 2,753,412.14
0.73 0.00 0.00 5.45 0.36
1764
1765– 4,972,328.99
2.61 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.60
1769
1770– 5,381,648.53
2.42 0.00 1.49 0.19 3.72
1774
1775– 12,974,673.67 2.93 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.77
1779
1780– 13,969,904.80 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.21
1784
1785– 11,711,510.81 1.45 0.00 0.17 0.60 0.68
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